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I. INTRODUCTION
Discovery of evidence that is not available in the United States is a
frequent problem in international litigation before United States courts.
A common element of international litigation in such complex cases is
that key witnesses reside abroad or crucial business documents belonging
to foreign litigants are located in other jurisdictions.1 Due to the fact-
dependent nature of these cases, courts in the United States have been
confronted with numerous legal and practical obstacles in their attempts
to obtain evidence, whether written or oral, from foreign litigants or non-
party witnesses. Discovery orders of United States courts relating to
testimonial or documentary evidence situated in foreign countries have
generated a great deal of legal and political controversy, not only in the
area of private suits but also in the field of agency and grand jury
investigations.
1 "[Tthe heart of any United States antitrust case is the discovery of business documents. With-
out them, there is virtually no case." In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155
(1979). See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan United States Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 49 (D.D.C.
1974)("the absence of necessary foreign discovery would sound the death knell of a plaintiff's case");
Hollmann, Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Antitrust Litigation, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 461 (1976);
Light, Discovery Abroad and the Consequence When Discovery is not Possible, 50 ANTrrRusr L.J. 577
(1981); Newman, Potential Havens from United States Jurisdiction and Discovery Laws in Interna-
tionalAntitrust Enforcement, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 240 (1980); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and
Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.. 612, 615 (1979)[hereinafter Foreign
Nondisclosure Laws]; Rahl, Enforcement and Discovery Conflicts in Foreign Trade, in FIFrH AN-
NUAL FORDHAM CoRpoRATE LAW INsTrruTE 343 (B. Hawk ed. 1979).
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As early as 1956, attempts by United States courts to obtain evi-
dence in foreign countries were met with adverse reactions:
I am certainly not prepared to hold that persons or corporations within the
jurisdiction of the English courts should be subjected to a wider form of
inquisition in relation to an action pending in a foreign court than that to
which they would be liable if the action were being tried . . . in this
country.2
The reasons for these conflicts are numerous and have given rise to
an abundance of legal writing.' Nevertheless, no guidelines as to how
these international discovery disputes could be resolved have emerged.
As will be demonstrated, one of the reasons for the continuing uncer-
tainty is the insufficient evaluation of foreign laws opposing United States
discovery proceedings.
II. PROCEDURAL DEVICES FOR OBTAINING EVIDENCE
As regards the procedural devices for obtaining evidence in interna-
tional litigation, United States courts have two basic options to order
discovery.4 First, international treaties as well as bilateral agreements,
such as the Exchange of Notes between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany relating to diplomatic and consular depositions, 5
provide for legal mechanisms through which foreign authorities respond
to discovery requests emanating from the United States.6 The most im-
portant international legal instrument in this field is the Hague Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.7
This Convention provides a standardized procedure for obtaining evi-
dence in a foreign country. It makes letters of request the principal
means for judicial assistance between two countries.8 In addition, the
Convention provides for the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers,
2 Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., 1 Q.B. 618, 634 (1956) (Barry, J.). See also Collins,
The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunderstanding?, 35 INr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 765, 770-71 (1986).
3 McKay, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Litigation, A Selected Bibliog-
raphy, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1217 (1984).
4 Cf Rogers, On the Exclusivity of the Hague Evidence Convention, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 441,
442-43 (1986).
5 32 U.S.T. 4181, T.I.A.S. No. 9938 (1980).
6 Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of the Hague
Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 478-79 (1983).
In the area of antitrust enforcement, the United States and several other countries, among them
the Federal Republic of Germany, have entered into bilateral cooperation agreements concerning the
exchange of information. See, eg. 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291 (1976). See generally Ramsey,
The United States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983). Other
bilateral agreements are listed in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCII) 1 50,283 (1976).
7 Opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (1972).
8 Id. arts. 1-14.
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consular agents and commissioners. 9 The details of the Convention pro-
cedures have been described in numerous articles. 0
Second, United States courts may order discovery pursuant to Rules
26 to 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In this context, the
question as to whether and, if so, to what extent and under which cir-
cumstances United States courts have recognized privileges based upon
foreign law in international discovery proceedings will be examined.12
The analysis will focus on civil litigation. However, frequent references
will also be made to discovery conflicts in the fields of administrative and
grand jury investigations.
The question of whether the Hague Evidence Convention preempts
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and qualifies as
the exclusive or the primary legal mechanism by which United States
discovery proceedings relating to testimonial or documentary evidence
situated in another jurisdiction have to be conducted, has been at issue in
a great number of cases both in federal 13 and state courts.' 4  The
Supreme Court has held recently that the Convention does not establish
exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining information located in
another signatory country.'
5
9 Id. arts. 15-22.
10 Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1973); Note, Obtaining Testimony Outside the United States"
Problems for the California Practicioner, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1237 (1978); Carter, Existing Rules and
Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5 (1979); Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the
United States - A Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575 (1982); Oxman, The Choice Between Direct
Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad The Impact of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, 37 U. MIAMi L. REv. 733 (1983); Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery
Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1984); Note, Gathering Evidence Abroad - The Hague Convention
Revisited, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 963 (1984); Wasserman, Conflicts of Lawr" Discovery Abroad
under Provisions of the Hague Convention, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 201 (1985); Maier, Extraterritorial
Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT. L.
239 (1986).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
12 See Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1031, 1053-54
(1961).
13 See Lowrance v. Michael Weinig GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Work v.
Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360
(D. Vt. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. United States Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1983); McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Lasky v. Continen-
tal Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
14 See Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (rex. App. 1st Dist. 1984); Vincent v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Ma-
schinenfabrik v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 1985); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489
N.Y.S.2d 575, 108 A.D.2d 393 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1985).
15 Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). In this Article, frequent references will be made to several
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III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCOVERY ORDERS
AGAINST FOREIGN PARTIES
This Article will not discuss the various legal prerequisites relating
to United States discovery proceedings against foreign litigants or non-
party witnesses.16 It is therefore assumed that the legal requirements
concerning statutory competence over the subject matter of the suit17 are
fulfilled, that service of process either according to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters1 8 or on the basis of Rule 4 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure has been properly performed,' 9 and that personal ju-
risdiction over the foreign person subpoenaed is present.20
As the title indicates, this Article will not examine the whole range
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in this case. See 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1475 (1986).
See also Note, International Discovery United States-Style, and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 94-97 (1986)(comprehensive survey of earlier federal and state court
decisions)[hereinafter International Discovery].
16 As to discovery against United States citizens residing abroad, see Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421 (1932):
[A] citizen of the United States... continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue
of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him, and he was
bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country .... [O]ne of the duties of such
absent citizens to the United States is that of attending its courts to give testimony when prop-
erly summoned .... And the Congress may provide for the performance of this duty and
prescribe penalties for disobedience.
Id. at 436, 438.
17 See Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of United States Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575 (1979); Feinberg, The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion, 30 AM. U.L. Rtv. 323 (1981); Sornarjah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States
Antitrust Laws, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 127 (1982); Brewster, Jurisdictional Conflicts Arising from
Antitrust Enforcement, Panel Discussion, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (1985).
The following cases have dealt with the statutory scope of agency subpoena powers concerning
the production of evidence located abroad: Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Nahas, 738
F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984); SEC v. Zanganeh, 470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Civil Aeronautics
Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Fed. Trade Comm'n.
v. Texaco Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Montship Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, 295 F.2d
147 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
18 Opened for signature, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (1969); Rogers, supra,
note 4 at 443-44.
19 Smit, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation: Some Observations on the Roles of Interna-
tional Law and Reciprocity, 9 NEDERLANDS ThDSCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAL REcHT 137, 139-
40 (1962); See also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint Gobain Pont & Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Oliver, International Law and Foreign Investigatory Subpoenas Sought to Be
Served Without the Consent or Cooperation of the Territorial Sovereign, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 409
(1982); Victor & Hood, Personal Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of Process in Antitrust Cases Involv-
ing International Trade, 46 ANTIrRusT L.J. 1063 (1978).
20 Int'l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)(due process requires that a non-
resident defendant must "have certain minimum contacts" with the forum so that the exercise of
jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of 'fair play and substantial justice' "); Hansen v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)("[I]n each case it is essential that there be some act by which the
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of foreign legal obstacles which might be invoked by foreign parties or
witnesses against United States discovery orders based upon the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but will focus on the problem of foreign privi-
leges. This legal concept, which has not yet received a great deal of
scholarly attention, must be distinguished from other objections based
upon foreign law and designed to oppose discovery orders of United
States courts relating to oral testimony or written evidence connected
with that legal system.21 In order to illustrate the differences between the
United States and foreign discovery procedures frequent references will
be made to the West German ("German") Codes of Civil and Criminal
Procedure, the legal system with which the author of this Article is most
familiar. 22
IV. DEFINITION OF PRIVILEGE
Four legal concepts designed to prevent the taking of testimonial or
documentary evidence from foreign nationals will be briefly described so
as to distinguish them from the notion of privilege. Most conflicts in the
field of international discovery proceedings have been caused by foreign
"blocking statutes."23 This term has never been defined, because the dif-
ferent statutes vary widely in their scope and applicability. 4 They have
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.").
See also Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporate Parents and Affiliates in Antitrust
Actions, 5 SYRACUSE . INT'L L. 149 (1977); Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Subsidiaries, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319 (1983).
21 See Friedman & Wilson, Representing Foreign Clients in Civil Discovery and Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 26 VA. . INT'L L. 327, 379 (1986)(survey of discovery defenses based on foreign law).
22 See Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systerrw Germany and
the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 750 (1986); Gottwald, Simplified Civil Procedure in West
Germany, 31 AM. . COMP. L. 687 (1983); Heck, Transnational Litigation II: Federal Republic of
Germany and the FEC, 18 INT'L LAw. 793 (1984); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1443, 1471 (1958)[hereinafter Kaplan]; Martens,
German Civil Procedure and the Implementation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 1 INT'L Lrr. Q.
115 (1985). See also Collins, supra note 2, at 767-69 (brief description of the differences between
United States and British discovery principles).
23 See Batista, Confronting Foreign Blocking Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from
Non-Resident Parties to United States Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61 (1983); Bishop, International
Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Countries, 19 Hous. L. Rav. 361 (1982); Blythe,
The Extraterritorial Impact of the Antitrust Laws: Protecting British Trading Interests, 31 AM. J.
COMP. L. 99 (1983); Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block United StatesAntitrustActions, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982); Comment, Secrecy and Blocking Laws" A Growing Problem as the
Internationalization of Securities Markets Continues, 18 VAND. . TRANSNAT. L. 809 (1985); Note,
Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 577 (1981).
24 See Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 327, 338 n.32 (list of blocking statutes).
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been enacted for various reasons25 although the primary goal of these
laws is to thwart the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and to pre-
vent the production of confidential business information to foreign judi-
cial or administrative authorities. 26  The main feature of blocking
statutes, i.e., the general or specific prohibition to comply with foreign
discovery orders, is rarely distinguished from the concept of privilege,
i.e., the right to refuse disclosure of certain information or communica-
tions arising from a particular relationship.27
Privileges may overlap statutory obligations accompanied by crimi-
nal or administrative sanctions against disclosure of certain evidence,
whether directed against discovery orders issued by foreign courts or law
enforcement authorities2 8 or equally designed to protect confidential in-
formation in a purely domestic context.2 9 To a certain extent prohibi-
25 INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRsT CONFERENCE, TOKYO, 1964, at 561-62
[hereinafter FIFry-FRstT CONFERENCE]. See also Gen. Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90
F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981); In Re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp.
298, 311-14, 317-21 (D.D.C. 1960); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
26 Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in io-
lation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 487, 506 (1969). See also Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005 (1976);
Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1320
(1983); Note, Reaching for Documents in a Foreign Country, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 119 (1985).
A prominent example is the British Protection of Trading Interests Act (reprinted in 21 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 834, 839 (1982)), which vests power in the Secretary of State for Trade to pre-
vent disclosure when it appears that foreign measures pose a threat to British trading interest. Born,
Recent British Responses to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: The Midland Bank
Decision and Retaliatory Legislation Involving Unitary Taxation, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1985). See
also Canada's Business Records Protection Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 56 (1980)(prohibiting the taking,
sending, or removing of certain types of business records from Ontario).
27 Armed Force, Peaceful Settlement, and the United Nations Charter: Are There Alternatives to a
"New International Anarchy," American Soc'y of Int'l Law, Proceedings, 77th Annual Meeting,
1983, at 67, 69 (Remarks by J. Schmertz); Comment, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign
Jurisdiction Where Law of the Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 295, 297 (1962); Paikin,
Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Foreign States for Use in Federal Criminal Prosections, 22 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT. L. 233, 236 (1984).
28 See Act No. 80-538 July 16, 1980, J.O. 1799 (Fr.)(on the Communication of Economic, Com-
mercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons); see also Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L.
382 (1981); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585 (1982).
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code states: "A person who, through searching, secures a manu-
facturing or business secret, in order to make it accessible to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign
organization, or to a private business enterprise, or to their agents, a person who makes accessible a
manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a
private business enterprise, or to their agents, shall be punished .. "
29 See Section 404 of the German Corporation Act, September 6, 1965, BGBI.I 1089, 1183 (obli-
gation of corporate executives and employees not to reveal business secrets); von Huelsen, Kanadis-
che und Europdische Reaktionen auf die USpre trial discovery, 28 RECHTrDER INTERNATIONALEN
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tions relating to the disclosure of business secrets on grounds of public
policy, such as national security considerations, may also be in the pri-
vate interest with regard to competitive aspects, but these two concepts
are to be distinguished.30
Some countries which have not enacted general blocking laws, such
as the Federal Republic of Germany,3" have nevertheless objected to
United States discovery orders requiring the production of evidence lo-
cated abroad on the ground of "judicial sovereignty."32 This doctrine
has not gone unchallenged by United States courts, which have rejected
the suggestion that the discovery of documentary material abroad could
affect other judicial systems.33  Indeed, the notion of "judicial sover-
eignty" has never been defined.34 In any event, German government au-
thorities have never argued that such a violation of "judicial sovereignty"
created a public policy privilege for German defendants capable of being
invoked against United States discovery orders.
Moreover, it is important to distinguish a privilege from a claim that
disclosure of the requested evidence would entail civil liability or other
disadvantages in the area of private commercial relations. Such a claim
WIRiScHAFr 537, 552 (1982); see also Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, ch. 34, 41 (prohibition
of disclosure of confidential business information); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 1,
at 612-13 n.4, 5.
30 See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(Wilkey, J.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). A good example of this important distinction is provided by Section
53 of the West German ("German") Code of Criminal Procedure, and Section 203 of the West
German ("German") Criminal Code. A juxtaposition of these two provisions reveals that, under
Section 53, a certain number of persons, such as reporters, enjoy a privilege not to disclose confiden-
tial information received in their professional capacity, although there is no criminal sanction if the
reporter none the less discloses the information. In contrast, according to Section 203, members of
other professions, such as psychologists, are liable to criminal sanctions if they disclose information
entrusted to them in their occupational capacity. However, they do not enjoy a privilege to refuse
testimony at trial.
31 But see Federal Maritime Shipping Act, May 24, 1965, § 11 (1965) BGBL II, 833, 835 (fol-
lowing the British Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 870)(exception for
shipping information).
32 Schroeder v. Lufthansa, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223 (N.D. Ill. 1983); See also Cooper
Indus. Inc. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Int'l Soc. for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, Brief
for Petitioner, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1475, 1482-83 (1986); Brief for the Federal Republic of
Germany, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1540, 1546-48 (1986).
33 Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616, 618 (D. Mass. 1985); In re
Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Messerschmidt Boelkow Blohm
GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1985); Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, Brief for Re-
spondent, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1568, 1574-75 (1986).
34 Rogers, supra note 4, at 450-51; SocitdNationale Industrielle Airospatiale, Brief of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1515 (1986). See also Note, The
Hague Service Convention and Agency Concepts" Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 20
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391, 401 (1987).
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was unsuccessfully made by the defendant in United States v. First Na-
tional City Bank." Similarly, in another case where a German bank
challenged grand jury subpoenas requiring the production of customer
bank records, inter alia, on the ground that compliance with the subpoe-
nas would subject the bank to penalties for breach of confidentiality
under German law, the court held that the United States interest in en-
forcing its criminal laws outweighed any countervailing interests or hard-
ships asserted by the bank.36 Thus, the mere interest of a person in
withholding certain evidence because of a private duty and the possibility
of civil liability or unfavorable economic consequences without the pres-
ence of a constitutional, statutory or common law right to refuse disclo-
sure cannot be qualified as a privilege.
Finally, mere variations in matters of procedure between two legal
systems do not create substantive rights for those foreign defendants
whose legal system provides for more restrictive discovery procedures.
For example, under the German Code of Civil Procedure, (which has no
counterpart to United States pre-trial discovery), parties are not under an
unqualified obligation to answer interrogatories and may not be com-
pelled to testify. 7 This basic rule is well illustrated by a decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) which held that "a party is
under no obligation to help its opponent win a trial by providing material
which is not available to the other party."3 This principle has been af-
firmed in the context of a letter of request procedure under the Hague
Evidence Convention. The court stated that the "prohibition against
fishing expeditions in German procedural law is designed for the protec-
tion of the adversary who is not required to make available to the oppos-
ing party the weapons for the conduct of the lawsuit."39
Also, under Section 422 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, a
party may be compelled to furnish documentary evidence only if there is
a legal obligation based upon substantive law or if the party concerned
35 396 F.2d 897, 900, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1968).
36 In re Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24, 26, 29 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
37 Martens, Erfahrungen mit Rechtshilfeersuchen aus den USA, 27 RECHT )ER INTERNATION-
ALEN WIRTSCHAFT 725, 729-30 (1981); Gamp, Die Bedeutung des Ausforschungsbeweises im Zivil-
prozess, 60 DEUTSCHE RiCHTERZEITUNG 165 (1982); Judgments of July 9, 1974 and of February 18,
1970, Bundesgerichtshof ("BGH"), 27 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift ("NJW") 1710, and BGH,
27 NJW 751. See also Kaplan, supra, note 22, at 1241-42.
38 Judgment of May 4, 1964, BGH, 17 NJW 1414; see also judgment of February 29, 1968,
BGH, 21 NJW 1233.
39 Coming Glass Works v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., Judgments of October 31 and November 27,
1980, Oberlandesgericht Muenchen, 36 JURISTENZErrUNG 538, 540-41 (1981), translated in 20
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1049 (1981). See also judgment of June 10, 1981, Landgericht Muenchen,
95 Zeitschrift fuer Zivilprozess 362 (1982), affirming the trade secret privilege under Section 384(3)
of the German Code of Civil Procedure in the same letter of request proceedings.
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has cited the documents in question in support of the pleadings.'4 In
addition, if documents are in possession of a non-party witness, a sepa-
rate action has to be brought against that third person pursuant to Sec-
tion 429 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.4' This legal concept is
evidenced by the Declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany
pursuant to Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention that "it will
not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-
trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries."'42
V. DISCOVERY PRINCIPLES UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The discovery principles established by the United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."4 3 Parties can discover in ad-
vance of trial all facts and issues underlying the controversy. 44 This pol-
icy was stated by Justice Murphy in Hickman v. Taylor45 as follows:
(C)ivil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.
The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
..(T)he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his oppo-
nent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.
46
In United States v. Bryan,47 the Supreme Court emphasized "the
great power of testimonial compulsion, so necessary to the effective func-
tioning of courts and legislatures" from which exemptions may be
granted only for "a substantial individual interest which has been found,
through centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the
40 Judgment of December 15, 1965, BGH, 1966 Betriebsberater 99; Heck, US. Misinterpretation
of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 231, 244-45 (1986); Kaplan, supra
note 22, at 1240; Note, International Discovery, supra note 15, at 119; Platto, supra note 10, at 583.
41 German Civil Code § 810 (substantive legal obligation to produce documents); Judgment of
September 25, 1979, Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, 34 Monatsschrift fuer Deutsches Recht ("MDR")
228. See also Stuerner, Rechtshilfe nach dem Haager Beweisuebereinkommen fuer Common Law
Laender, 36 JURISTENZErrUNG 521 (1981); Shemanski, supra note 6, at 481-83.
42 Announcement on the Ratification of the Evidence Convention, June 21, 1979, BGBL.II 780;
West German Implementing Act, December 22, 1977 § 14, BGBL I 3105, 3106.
43 FED R. Civ. P. 1.
44 Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 944-46 (1961)[hereinafter
Developments].
45 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46 Id. at 501, 507.
47 339 U.S. 323 (1949).
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search for truth."4 In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. the
Supreme Court stated that, "Modem instruments of discovery serve a
useful purpose .... They together with pretrial procedures make a trial
less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.... Only strong
public policies weigh against disclosure."'49
According to the Supreme Court, privilege exceptions to the princi-
ple of full disclosure of all relevant testimonial and documentary evi-
dence "must not be lightly created nor expansively construed."50 As
Judge Learned Hand noted with regard to administrative or grand jury
investigations, "strong public policy ...favors techniques and proce-
dures designed to reach the truth. The power of subpoena is an essential
instrument of evidence-locating and fact-finding. Only when that policy
is in conflict with weightier policy is privilege against disclosure
granted.""'
VI. THE PRIVILEGE EXCEPTION IN UNITED STATES LAW
The most important limitation to the discovery powers of the courts
is the privilege exception. Privileges may be invoked both in civil litiga-
tion and in agency investigations, as well as in grand jury proceedings.
For example, in the area of administrative investigations the Anti-
trust Civil Process Act stipulates with regard to civil investigative de-
mands by the Department of Justice that:
No such demand shall require the production of any documentary material,
the submission of any answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of
any oral testimony, if such material, answers, or testimony would be pro-
tected from disclosure under -
(A) the standards applicable to subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum
issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation,
or
(B) the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ....52
Similarly, a person may object to civil investigative demands made
by the Federal Trade Commission on the ground that he "is entitled to
refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitutional or other
48 Id. at 331-32.
49 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
- 50 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 352,
356-57.
51 See also In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified sub. norL
Ings. v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960). See also McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.
1937)(Hand, J.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c) (1982).
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legal right or privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."53 Also in other areas of federal administrative law, courts have
recognized that agency investigations are "subject to the same testimo-
nial privileges as judicial proceedings." 54
Discovery in civil litigation is restricted according to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which stipulate that "parties may obtain dis-
covery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sub-
ject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery."55
It is important to distinguish a privilege established under the Fed-
eral Rules from the legal possibility of restricting discovery by means of a
protective order. 6 For example, trade secrets 57 or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information conferring a competi-
tive advantage is listed as one of the legitimate interests entitled to a
protective order. However, this kind of information does not enjoy a
privilege under the Federal Rules.58 Since the granting of a protective
order is vested in the discretion of the judiciary, the grounds upon which
such an order may be issued do not qualify as an absolute right to refuse
testimony.59
53 15 U.S.C. § 57(b)-l(C)(12)(D)(ii). See also 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.7(d), 2.8(A).
54 McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d at 378; In re Fed. Trade Comm'n Line of Business Report Litig.,
595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Comment, Privileged Communications Before FederalAdministrative
Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 395 (1964). See also Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963)(attorney-client privilege
in administrative proceedings); Peterson, Attorney-Client Privileges in Internal Revenue Service Inves-
tigations, 54 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
55 FED R. Civ P. 26(b)(1).
56 See, eg. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450,
1650 (1985). Census material collected pursuant to the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1982), was
held to be privileged by the Supreme Court, Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
57 The most widely cited definition is from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, Comment
(b)(1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a
list of customers.
The Freedom of Information Act exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial information
which is obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" from disclosure. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4)(1982). According to the REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, S. REP. N
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), exemption No. 4 of the Act includes business sales statistics,
inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes as well as information customarily subject
to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges.
58 Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1978); Nat'l Util. Serv. Inc. v. North-
western Steel & Wire Co., 426 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1970); Davis v. General Motors Corp., 64
F.R.D. 420, 422 (N.D. 11. 1974).
59 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1983). Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens:
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As used in the Federal Rules the term "not privileged" refers to the
notion of privilege as it is understood in the law of evidence.' A matter
is privileged from discovery if it would be privileged at trial under the
applicable rules of evidence.61 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide
that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
62
The Federal Rules of Evidence as proposed by the Advisory Com-
mittee and approved by the Supreme Court contained provisions recog-
nizing and defining nine non-constitutional privileges.63 Congress,
however, preferred to adopt one general provision so as to leave room for
new judicial developments and allow flexibility in the application of
traditional privileges on a case-by-case basis. This legislative intent was
later confirmed by the Supreme Court."4
Similarly, the Federal Rules relating to the execution of foreign let-
ters rogatory by which United States courts grant judicial assistance to
foreign and international tribunals do not provide a list of privileges upon
A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L. Rav. 207,
231 (Trade secrets are not privileged in the law of evidence: Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure authorizes the courts to order that a "trade secret or other confidential... commer-
cial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."). See also Trade Secrets
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets by government officials).
60 Lincoln Am. Corp. v. Bryden, 375 F. Supp. 109,111 (D. Kan. 1974); Robinson v. Magovern,
83 F.R.D. 79, 84 (D. Pa. 1974). See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57,
64 (N.D. Ohio 1964)(reference to Rule 34 as it incorporates notion of privilege from Rule 26 (b)).
61 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953).
62 FED R. EVID. 501.
63 Deleted Rules 502 to 510 (56 F.R.D. 234-58). The privileges included required reports, attor-
ney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, clergyman-communicant, political vote, trade
secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and identity of informer.
64 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). Rule 501 allows the judicial creation of
new privileges: In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Mackey, 405 F.
Supp. 854, 857-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)(Weinstein, J.) ("Despite their deletion by Congress, the privilege
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court remain of considerable utility as standards. Congress ex-
pressed no disagreement with their substance; it eliminated them primarily because they were con-
sidered substantive in nature and not a fit subject for rule making.").
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which discovery of documentary evidence may be refused.6" The rules
stipulate that a person "may not be compelled.., to give his testimony
or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any
legally applicable privilege."66
Although the differences between United States and foreign legal
systems with respect to the number and the scope of privileges will be
examined in detail, it should be noted that civil law systems in general
provide for broader protection of privileges. As opposed to trade secrets
in the United States, business privacy enjoys privilege protection under
the German Code of Civil Procedure.67 Consequently, United States dis-
covery orders are often considered by German litigants as intrusive and
damaging to their competitive position.68 In contrast, no privileges are
available under United States federal law to accountants,
69 brokers, 70
bankers71 or reporters.72
65 Augustine, Obtaining International Assistance Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Hague Convention, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 101, 104 (1980).
66 15 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982)(emphasis added); Smit, International Litigation Under the United
States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1032 (1965). According to a congressional Report, the
above-mentioned provision applies to all proceedings conducted pursuant to section 1782 and pro-
vides for the recognition of all privileges to which the person may be entitled, including privileges
recognized by foreign law. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3782, 3790 (1964). The privileges
extend beyond the protection against self-incrimination, but their exact scope was left open for fu-
ture determination.
67 German Code of Civil Procedure § 384.
68 The "artistic and commercial secrets" privilege in civil proceedings has been interpreted very
broadly by German courts. Privileged information extends to all technical, financial or commercial
data whose confidential treatment is in the legitimate interest of the person concerned. See Stuerner,
Die gewerbliche Geheimsphaeretim Zivilprozess, 1985 JURISTENZEITUNG 453, 454; Judgment of
April 21, 1977, OLG Hamburg, 1977 MDR 761; Judgment of September 15, 1977, OLG Dues-
seldorf, 1978 MDR 147; Gottwald, Zur Wahrung von Geschaeftsgeheimnissen im Zivilprozess, 1979
BETRIEBSBERATER 1780; Shemanski, supra note 6, at 480; Heck, supra note 40, at 243-44; Schlosser,
Internationale Rechtshilfe und rechtsstaatlicher Schutz von Beweispersonen, 94 ZErrsCHRIFT FUER
ZIVILPRozEss 369, 402-04 (1981). See also Sociiti Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at
2563 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) describing the constitutional protection of personal privacy, com-
mercial property and business secrets under German law.
69 Couch v. United States, 408 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731,
734 (7th Cir. 1962)("We are not persuaded that the relationships between several members of a trade
association and the association accountant should be considered a relationship equally valued, for
the same reason, as the personal relationship between husband and wife, priest and penitent, physi-
cian and patient, when to do so would result in frustration of the Federal Government's performance
of a necessary investigatory function."). See also Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.),
cerL denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
70 McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d at 378.
71 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39, 52-54 (1974) (Bank Secrecy Act not
violative of the Fourth Amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-11 (1975)(Fifth
Amendment protection not applicable to documentary summons); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 437 (1976)(no "legitimate expectation of privacy" concerning bank records).
The Supreme Court has also held that foreign bank secrecy laws do not make foreign bank
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VII. CONFLICT OF LAW RULES
If a litigant or a witness refuses to testify or to produce documentary
evidence invoking a privilege different from the law of the forum, a con-
flict of laws question arises. According to a long-standing principle of
conflict of laws, the law of the forum governs procedural matters.73
The lex fori doctrine has come under increasing scrutiny regarding
both interstate and international discovery proceedings. Various at-
tempts have been made in the law of evidence to distinguish between
rules amounting to substantive law and provisions with mere procedural
character.74 Modern legal doctrines recognize that the law of evidence
records subject to Fourth Amendment protection. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732
n.4 (1980)("We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian law of bank secrecy
creats an expectation of privacy not present in United States v. Miller."). See also United States v.
Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1976); Comment, Is There a Right of Privacy in Bank Records?
10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 378 (1977); Note, Business Records and the Fifth Amendment Right Against
Self-Incrimination, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 351 (1977).
72 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
73 Developments, supra note 44, at 1050. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D.
280, 286 (D.D.C. 1962); Arthur Anderson Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977)("Foreign law may not control local law.") See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122, 127 (1971):
§ 122 Issues Relating to Judicial Administration: A court usually applies its own local law
rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of
another state to resolve other issues in the case.
§ 127 Pleading and Conduct of Proceedings: The local law of the forum governs rules of plead-
ing and the conduct of proceedings in court.
Comment (a): The local law of the forum governs... pre-trial practice, including the taking
and use of depositions, discovery and penalties for refusal to comply with proper request for
information.
See Comment, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law, 50 FORDHAM
L.REv. 877, 885 (1982); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 1, at 614; Friedman & Wil-
son, supra note 21, at 339. See also 3 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
493-94 (2d ed. 1964); Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953), modified and affirmed, Soci&t Internationale
Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956), revised on other grounds sub nom. Soci&t6 Internationale v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958)("Procedures of the law of the forum customarily govern law suits.
Neutrals as well as citizens of the United States must meet the requirements of these procedures. It
seems obvious that foreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the investigation and discovery of
facts in a case, under rules established as conducive to the proper and orderly administration of
justice in a court of the United States. Even if a foreign government were itself a party, it must
conform to the law of the forum and make discovery upon order of the court.").
74 Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 717 (1957); Hay, Interstate Versus International Conflicts Law in the United States, 35 RABELS
ZErrsCHRIFr 429 (1971); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956); Smit, supra note 66, at 1034 ("The conflict of laws rules
prevailing in this area are far from settled."); Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Fac-
ing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 353, 361, 370-71 (1969)(distin-
guishing three types of evidence rules, one of them being privilege rules).
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contains a certain number of substantive rules which are not subject to
the lex fori because they go beyond regulating the conduct of the law-
suit.7 5 Privileges have been identified as evidentiary rules which are
designed to foster certain interests and values that are extrinsic to the
litigation context.76 Privileges may determine the outcome of lawsuits,
but they are not intended to achieve such a result because they do not
have a procedural purpose. They are normally based upon common law
or legislatively determined policies promoting certain confidential rela-
tionships or the protection of privacy.7 7
The Supreme Court has refused to establish a general distinction
between substantive and procedural questions78 emphasizing that this di-
chotomy "implies different variables depending upon the particular prob-
lem ' 79 and that the definition of substance and procedure "shifts as the
legal context changes."8 0 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, Justice Frank-
furter stated:
Matters of 'substance' and matters of 'procedure' are much talked about in
the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole
domain of law. But, of course, 'substance' and 'procedure' are the same
keywords to very different problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure'
represents the same invariants.81
75 Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell
for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 613, 712-13 (1967); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Sub-
stantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 467, 483-84 (1957).
76 Ex Parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953)(newspaper privilege protecting the
identity of the source of certain information as a pronouncement of public policy); see also In re
Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Dunham, Testimonial Privileges in State
and Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 26, 42, 47 (1973); Louisell &
Cuppin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413 (1956); Miller, supra note 75, at 746; Sterk,
Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L. REv. 461,
488 (1977); Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56
COLUM. L. REv. 535, 535-36, 548 (1956).
77 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1962)(Waterman,
J.)("[S]ince it goes to relationships established and maintained outside the area of litigation, and
'affect[s] people's conduct at the stage of primary private activity and should therefore be classified
as substantive or quasi-substantive...' "). See also Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir.
1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 965 (1956); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 407-09 (5th Cir.
1960); Krizak v. W.C. Brooks & Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 43 (4th Cir. 1963); Kaminski, State Eviden-
tiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 923 (1975); Note, Functional Over-
lap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals" Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1248 (1962).
78 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1944); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74
(1965).
79 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108.
80 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 471, 472 ("uncertain area between substance and procedure").
81 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108.
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VIII. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Two Supreme Court decisions have so far dealt with international
discovery conflicts. The problem concerning the recognition of foreign
privileges, however, was not directly at issue in these cases. It should be
noted that the Supreme Court in both instances expressly rejected any
rigid approach to resolve conflicts between the discovery principles of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the one hand and foreign as well as
international law on the other.
In Socidtd Internationale v. Rogers,82 the Supreme Court had to de-
termine the effect of a foreign legal prohibition (Article 273 of the Swiss
Penal Code prohibiting "economic espionage") which prevented the for-
eign litigant from complying with a United States discovery order re-
garding the production of business documents. The Supreme Court
expressly stated that its opinion was limited to the facts of the case 3 and
the question of whether dismissal of the complaint with prejudice 'was
justified. The Court emphasized that no general rule was established in
the area of international discovery conflicts.8 4 Further, the problem of
privilege recognition did not arise because the foreign plaintiff conceded
in the proceedings before the Supreme Court that it was subject to the
United States procedural rules and asserted "no immunity from them." 5
It should be noted, however, that the Swiss litigant had initially as-
serted a banker-customer privilege.8 6 The District Court rejected this
privilege relating to the plaintiff's bank records.8 7 In addition, the Court
held:
No man can sue in the courts of any country, whatever his rights may be,
82 Socis&6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). For detailed descriptions of the Rogers
case, see Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 341; Comment, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial
Discovery, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 841, 844-45 (1986); Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to
Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441, 1458-59 (1963)[hereinafter Note,
Limitations]; Note, Ordering Production of Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31
U. CHI. L. REv. 791 (1964); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in United States Antitrust
Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Pro-
duction, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 749 (1974).
83 Soci&t6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 205-06 ("We do not say that this ruling would
apply to every situation where a party is restricted by law from producing documents over which it is
otherwise shown to have control.")
84 Id. at 213 ("We decide only that on this record dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was
not justified.").
85 Id. at 211-12 ("Petitioner has sought no privileges because of its foreign citizenship which are
not accorded domestic litigants in United States courts. .. . It does not claim that Swiss law pro-
tecting bank records should here be enforced. It explicitly recognizes that is is subject to procedural
rules of United States courts in this litigation and has made full efforts to follow these rules. It
asserts no immunity from them. It asserts only its inability to comply because of foreign law.").
86 Sociit6 Internationale v. McGranery, Ill F. Supp. 435, 438-39 (D.D.C. 1953).
87 Id. at 443.
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unless in conformity with the rules prescribed by the laws of that country
... A claimant must take the law as he finds it; he cannot place himself in a
better position than other litigants by invoking the laws and procedures of a
foreign sovereign. 8
On appeal, the plaintiff abandoned the challenge to the Court's re-
fusal to grant a foreign privilege not available under United States law to
a foreign plaintiff.8 9 The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's
ruling and rejected any suggestion that a foreign plaintiff could avail him-
self of rights not recognized under United States law.90
The other Supreme Court opinion in the area of international dis-
covery conflicts dealt with the relationship between the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention.91 Although the
Supreme Court refused to accord primacy to this international treaty
over United States discovery rules,92 the opinion contains numerous ad-
monitions addressed to United States courts to exercise their discretion-
ary power in such a way that "intrusive" discovery orders are avoided.
93
This accommodating approach adopted by the Supreme Court94 seems to
stop short of a recognition of foreign privileges, but privileges were not
directly at issue in this case.95 Article 11 of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion expressly provides for a recognition of foreign privileges in the con-
text of a letter rogatory procedure:
In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to
give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the
evidence (a) under the law of the State of execution; or (b) under the law of
the State of origin, and the privilege or duty has been specified in the Letter,
or, at the instance of the requested authority, has been otherwise confirmed
to that authority by the requesting authority. A Contracting State may
88 Id. at 444. See also Soci&6 Internationale v. McGrath, 9 F.R.D. 680, 681 (D.D.C. 1950)(The
court ordered the plaintiff to answer certain questions holding that "foreign law or foreign privilege
is not a valid excuse for a refusal to answer the questions.").
89 Soci6t6 Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d at 536, n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Weinstein,
supra note 76, at 538; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 133-35; Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at
332, 346.
90 Soci&6t Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d at 541.
91 Societd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542.
92 Id. at 2555-56.
93 Id. at 2556.
94 Sociti Nationale IndustrielleAfrospatiale, Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
1986 INT'L LEOAL MATERIALS 1504, 1507 ("Certain foreign interests merit accommodation, among
them policies safeguarding substantive liberty, property or privacy interests.").
95 Petitioners' Brief to the Supreme Court in Anschuetz & Co. GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth. and Messerschmidt Boelkow Blohm GmbH v. Walker (Nos. 85-98 and 85-99), app. 4;
Meessen, The International Law on Taking Evidence From, Not In, a Foreign State, 1986 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 816, 832, at 845: ("The comparison of privileges under German law and under
U.S. law is not at issue."). See also Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 788-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert denied 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
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declare that, in addition, it will respect privileges and duties existing under
the law of States other than the State of origin and the State of execution, to
the extent specified in that declaration.
96
The willingness of the Supreme Court to take into account foreign
substantive law opposing United States discovery orders coincides with a
great number of lower court opinions with regard to the applicability of
the Hague Evidence Convention as the primary instrument to obtain evi-
dence in international litigation.97 Several of these courts relied upon the
principle of comity as the legal basis for ordering discovery pursuant to
the Convention.9"
IX. CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN PRIVILEGES
This Article will examine how courts have addressed the problem of
privilege claims raised by foreign parties and witnesses and to what ex-
tent the courts have been prepared to recognize foreign privileges not
96 Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters=
Several Notes Concerning its Scope, Methods and Competence, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & P. 1031, 1047
(1984).
97 Cooper Industries v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Schroeder v. Luft-
hansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Philadelphia Gear
Corp. v. America Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42,48 (D.D.C. 1984); Gebr. EickhoffMaschinenfabrik u. Eisengies-
serei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497-501 (W. Va. 1985). In Volkswagenwerk AG v. Superior
Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981), and Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876
(1982), the courts reversed lower court orders for on-site inspections in West Germany and directed
the plaintiffs to proceed under the Hague Convention. See also Volkswagenwerk AG v. Superior
Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221 (1973)("A foreign corporation's amenability to local suit does not
signal automatic subjection of its internal affairs to courts of the forum, because the latter have no
jurisdiction over persons or property outside their territory.").
In Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A., 475 A.2d 686 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1984), the Con-
vention was held to provide the primary discovery procedure. See also S & S Screw Machine Co. v.
Cosa Co. & Gildemeister A.G., S1. op. No. 2-85-0-0036, p. 18 -19 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); Note, The
Hague Convention: A Practical Guide to the Convention, United States Case Law, Convention-Spon-
sored Review Commissions, and Responses of Other Signatory Nations, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
73 (1986); Struve, Discovery from Foreign Parties in Civil Cases before US. Courts, 16 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & P. 1101, 1109 n.35.
98 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)("Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.")
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Ings v. Ferguson 282 F.2d 149, 152-
53 (2d. Cir. 1960), emphasized that upon fundamental principles of international comity courts
should not order "such action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor, or at least,
an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures." See also Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280,
281 (1982).
The Recognition of Foreign Privileges
9:80(1988)
available under United States law. The caselaw will be supplemented by
a summary of comments dealing with the problem of privilege recogni-
tion from the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the American Bar Association. In addition,
resolutions by two international organizations concerning the protection
of confidential business information in transnational antitrust investiga-
tions will be examined. Finally, an attempt will be made to extract from
these different sources a certain number of general principles as to
whether and, if so, to what extent, foreign privileges should be recog-
nized in discovery conflicts before United States courts.
One of the earliest cases dealing with foreign rights opposing an
United States discovery order dates back to 1914. In Munroe v. United
States,99 the plaintiff challenged a criminal contempt fine for nonproduc-
tion of documents to a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
The documents concerned were located in France and in joint possession
of the plaintiff and his partners. 1°° The partnership, which was com-
posed of one French and four United States partners, was organized
under French law, but transacted business both in the United States and
France. Although the main question at issue was whether Munroe was
entitled to demand from his partners the removal of the documents from
France to the United States, the court recognized a right to refuse pro-
duction of documents on the following grounds:
As to this refusal the request was cotrect, because, the right being a joint
right, and the papers referred to, as well as the partners referred to, being in
a foreign country, where the business to which the papers related was trans-
acted, it was plain that the partners who resided there, and had the papers
in their possession had the privilege of objecting to their being forwarded to
a foreign country if they desired so to do. This is plain law, as was stated by
Vice Chancellor Shadwell in The Attorney General v. Wilson, 9 Simons,
pages 526 and 530. It may be added that this proposition is so clear that
there is no necessity of citing any authorities in reference thereto. It is true
that the court observed that if Munroe had been insistent upon a request for
the papers they would have been forwarded to this country; but there is no
evidence to that effect.101
The Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse litigation in the United King-
dom provides an interesting example of the differences between United
States and English privilege law.102 This case is of particular interest
because of the involvement of a United States judge in the privilege deter-
99 216 F. 107 (Ist Cir. 1914).
100 Id. at 108.
101 Id. at 109.
102 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 2 W.L.R. 81, 1 All E.R. 434
(1978)(House of Lords), reprinted in 17 ITr'L LEGAL MATEIRAts 38 (1977).
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mination. Letters rogatory were issued by a United States District Court
to the English judiciary seeking confidential business information from
an English corporation as well as from individuals raised the issue of a
privilege against self-incrimination."°3
According to Section 14(1) of the British Civil Evidence Act of
1968" in connection with Section 3(l)(b) of the Evidence (Proceedings
in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975, both private individuals, and corpo-
rate bodies enjoy a right to refuse testimony if, as a result of such testi-
mony, they would risk criminal prosecution and penalties including
those provided under the antitrust provisions of the Rome Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community. The comparable United
States privilege, based upon the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, is
limited to individuals and does not apply to corporation or other corpo-
rate entities. lO5 The protection of the Fifth Amendment (as compared to
German law'0 6) does not include the incrimination of close relatives nor
does it apply to the production of documents.1"7 The United States privi-
lege against self-incrimination is also not available if immunity from
prosecution has been granted.108 In addition, the notion as to what con-
103 See Wood & Carrera, The International Uranium Cartek Litigation and Legal Implications,
14 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 59, 92-100 (1979); Merhige, The Re Westinghouse Uranium Case: Problems
Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19 (1979); Note, Power to
Reverse Foreign Judgments The British Clawback Statute under International Law, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 1097, 1104 (1981); Blythe, supra note 23, at 112-17.
104 Section 14(1) providing in relevant parts: "The right of a person in any legal proceedings other
than criminal proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing if to
do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty
... shall apply only as regard criminal offences under the law of any part of the United Kingdom
and penalties provided for by such law .. " Wilson, The Implementation of the Hague Evidence
Convention by the Judicial Authorities of the United Kingdom, 1 INT'L Lrr. Q. 356 (1986); Collins,
supra note 2, at 778.
105 United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94
(1974). In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), the Supreme
Court held that a "real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution" must exist with regard to the
Fifth Amendment. See also United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986); Note,
Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to Persons in Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 699 (1987).
106 Section 52 of the German Code of Criminal procedure grants an unqualified right to refuse
testimony that might incriminate the fiancee, the spouse, or certain close relatives. Section 53 pro-
vides a privilege for a limited number of persons maintaining confidential relationships, such as
doctors and lawyers. However, this privilege may not be invoked if the client has consented to
disclosure. Section 384 of the German Code of Civil Procedure provides that testimony can be
refused if it might cause direct pecuniary damage to the witness or to a person to whom the witness
stands in a close blood relationship. A witness is also entitled to refuse testimony if this might
dishonor or incriminate the witness. Shemanski, supra note 6, at 485.
107 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1974). See also Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th
Cir. 1964).
108 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1970); Merhige, supra note 103, at 25.
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stitutes a criminal offense very often differs from one legal system to the
other. 109
As to the individual witnesses' claims of Fifth Amendment privilege
against giving oral evidence, the House of Lords ruled that, since it was a
claim for privilege under United States law, its validity had to be deter-
mined "as if it had been made in civil proceedings in the United
States."1" 0 With respect to this privilege question, Federal District Court
Judge Merhige, after the individual witnesses had refused to give oral
testimony before the consular officer designed to take evidence under the
letters rogatory, ruled that, as British subjects residing outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States, they were entitled to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution."'
The interesting aspect of this ruling is that Judge Merhige relied
upon United States constitutional law to determine whether a privilege
against self-incrimination was available. Judge Merhige applied United
States constitutional law even though the witnesses concerned were Brit-
ish subjects outside United States jurisdiction, and compliance with the
evidentiary request was required exclusively in the United Kingdom.
Although this ruling as well as the decision of the House of Lords were
given under relatively unusual circumstances,"' they show that both
courts were aware of the importance of the privilege question and the
implication of substantive rather than procedural rights.1 13 The ques-
tions at issue in this case are related to the problem of reverse privilege
conflicts in international discovery proceedings, i.e. the admissibility in
United States courts of evidence obtained in foreign countries under vio-
lation of United States constitutional rights. 14
The only appellate court opinion dealing with a conflict between
United States discovery rules and a non-blocking foreign legal system was
the 1968 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. First National City Bank.115 The case concerned an anti-
109 For the definition of criminal offenses under United States law, see United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
110 1 All E.R. at 445 (1978).
111 Merhige, supra note 103, at 24-25 (ruling of June 14, 1977). On June 22, 1977, the UK High
Court of Justice upheld the RTZ companies privilege claim; this ruling was affirmed on July 11,
1977, by the Court of Appeal, (1977) 3 All. E.R. 717. See also Lever, Aspects of Jurisdictional
Conflict in the Field of Discovery, in FIFTH ANNUAL FoRDHAM CORORATE LAW INSTITUTE, 358,
371 (B. Hawk ed. 1979); see also Wood & Carrera, supra note 103, at 98.
112 Merhige, supra note 103, at 24-25.
113 Lever, supra note Ill, at 368-79.
114 Paikin, supra note 27, at 240-41.
115 396 F.2d 897. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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trust investigation several customers of the defendant. The main ques-
tion was whether a grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring a bank to
produce documents containing confidential business information, which
were in possession of the bank's foreign branch in the Federal Republic
of Germany, could be enforced despite the fact that compliance with the
subpoena might subject the bank to economic loss or civil liability under
German law. The Court of Appeals held that the potential for civil lia-
bility was not a justification for disobeying the subpoena." 6 With respect
to the recognition of a privilege under German law, the Court of Appeals
approached the problem in two steps.
First, the court went beyond general statements concerning the reso-
lution of conflicts between United States law and foreign blocking stat-
utes and acknowledged that other conflicts, such as those resulting from
different levels of protection of certain interests, may exist and have to be
resolved. The court expressed its approach in the following terms:
We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the mere absence of criminal
sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a subpoena. Such a
rule would show scant respect for international comity; ... a court of one
country should make an effort to minimize possible conflict between its or-
ders and the law of a foreign State affected by its decision .... The vital
national interests of a foreign nation, especially in matters relating to eco-
nomic affairs, can be expressed in ways other than through criminal law." 7
On this basis the court proceeded to an analysis of the relevant Ger-
man law. After distinguishing between civil and criminal procedure," 8
the court correctly found that Section 53 of the German Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure (as opposed to the German Code of Civil Procedure) does
not furnish to banks a right to refuse disclosure of confidential business
information relating to their clients." 9
The court examined in great detail the relevant provisions of Ger-
man law in order to determine whether the bank could avail itself of a
privilege. One can assume that the court was prepared to recognize a
German privilege against disclosure of bank records in criminal proceed-
ings if such a privilege had been available to the defendant. Otherwise,
the thorough analysis of German law would not have been necessary.
This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the court referred to the
116 Id. at 904-05.
117 Id. at 902.
118 Id. at 903-04.
119 Id. See also Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 412; For the privilege of bankers under
Sections 383 and 384 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, see Judgment of July 13, 1968, Ober-
landesgericht Koeln, 1968 MDR 931; Judgment of November 25, 1953, Landgericht ("LG") Frank-
furt, 1954 NJW 688, 690; Judgment of January 10, 1978, LG Hamburg, 1978 NJW 958-59; S.
SICHTERMANN, BANKGEHEIMNIS UND BANKAUSKUNFr (3rd ed. 1984), at 210, 211, 223, and 224.
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privilege of bankers in civil proceedings under the German Code of Civil
Procedure 120 as distinguished from criminal proceedings.
A. Bank Secrecy Laws
Conflicts between United States discovery proceedings and foreign
laws protecting the confidentiality of certain financial information have
arisen in a number of antitrust cases as well as in criminal prosecutions
relating to tax evasion or securities fraud. The most recent examples are
investigations by United States law enforcement authorities designed to
gain information on foreign bank accounts used to handle illegal profits
from trade in narcotics. In these cases, foxeign banking statutes have
been regularly invoked to justify the refusal to comply with United States
discovery orders.
The concept of bank secrecy, which is normally invoked by foreign
banks and/or their customers, is not a uniform one.12 1 Considerable dif-
ferences exist among the various foreign legal systems providing for pro-
tection of bank secrets. 122 United States law furnishes relatively little
protection to bank records, because no constitutional or other privilege
exists as to the confidentiality of bank records.' 23 The question therefore
arises as to whether United States courts have recognized claims that
bank records located abroad were privileged evidence under the foreign
law and thereby immune from United States discovery proceedings, and,
if so, to what extent the privilege would be granted.
In 1959 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was one of the
first appellate courts to address a foreign privilege challenge to an investi-
120 United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903 n.10.
121 Haseltine, International Regulation of Securities Markets: Interaction Between United States
and Foreign Laws, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 307, 312-14 (1987)(emphasizing the distinction between
bank secrecy and blocking laws). While secrecy laws forbid the disclosure of records or the identity
of bank customers, blocking laws prohibit the disclosure, inspection or removal of documents lo-
cated in the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities. Secrecy laws protect
personal rights and can be waived only by the individuals. On the other hand, blocking laws protect
national rather than private interests and cannot be waived by a private party. Id.
See also Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 1, 30-39, Apps. A&B
(1984)(overview of secrecy and blocking laws); Comment, Secrecy and Blocking Laws: A Growing
Problem as the Internationalization of the Securities Markets Continues, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
809, 820-21 (1985)(brief history of bank secrecy).
122 See Fedders, Policing Internationalized United States Capital Markets-Methods to Obtain
Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89 (1984); Horowitz, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to
Launder Illegal Narcotics Profits: The Cayman Island Example, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 133 (1985);
Moessle, The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforcement in International Cases, 16
CASE W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986).
123 Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1982).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:80(1988)
gative subpoena seeking the production of bank records located in Pan-
ama.124 In its opinion, the court distinguished the bank's privilege from
the customer's privilege to refuse disclosure of financial information:
Assuming that this provision [Article 29 of the Panama Constitution stipu-
lating the inviolability of correspondence and other private documents] af-
fords privilege against disclosure in favor of those whose affairs are the
subject matter of the disclosure... there is no showing that the bank may
invoke [the customer's] constitutional privilege as it seeks to do. Assuming,
on the other hand, that this provision affords a privilege against disclosure
to bystanders, such as the Bank, who have information relating to the af-
fairs of others, there is no showing that criminal sanctions will attach if the
bank waives its privilege either voluntarily or at the command of its
sovereign. 
125
The court thereby acknowledged that a privilege based upon the law
of Panama was entitled to recognition under United States discovery
rules. However, the court concluded that the privilege was not available
in this case because the constitutional exception to the right of nondisclo-
sure applied. The court stated that the "Constitution did not specify that
the prohibition extended to the sovereign, either Panama or a foreign
sovereign, or that the exception was limited to a Panamanian authority
or Panamanian legal formalities. Nor was there evidence that such was
its effects."
126
In 1962, in a case which also involved the applicability of Panama
law, 127 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affrmed the previous
holding. The question of privilege recognition, however, was not ad-
dressed as clearly as in the earlier opinion. Instead, the court referred to
the broad principle of comity stating that the "Government, as well as
other litigants, has a real interest in civil and criminal cases in obtaining
evidence wherever located. However, we also have an obligation to re-
spect the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in
economic and legal philosophy from our own." 128
Ten years later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a
civil action for the recovery of damages resulting from fraudulent invest-
ment activities again had to deal with the question as to whether Swiss
bank secrecy law bars the disclosure of customers' identities in federal
discovery proceedings.129 The court's opinion reveals two interesting ap-
124 First National City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
125 Id. at 619.
126 Id. at 620.
127 Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
128 Id. at 613.
129 Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
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proaches to the problem of privilege recognition. First, the court, by ex-
amining the Code of Civil Procedure of the Swiss Ticino Canton, seemed
to embrace the principle that the privilege provisions contained in that
code, if applicable, had to be recognized under United States law.
130
Since the Ticino Code did not provide for a banker's privilege, the court
would have been entitled to reject a privilege claim based upon Ticino
law. Expert testimony, however, supported the conclusion that the Ti-
cino Code did not apply to proceedings in a United States court.
131
Second, the court briefly referred to "the idea of seeking waivers"
from the bank's customers. 132 The court reasoned that because Swiss
bank secrecy law was designed to protect the privacy of customers, the
client is the holder of the secret and may consent to a disclosure of his
identity by the bank. This proposition implies a recognition of the for-
eign customer's right to retain the confidentiality of certain financial
information.
As regards the legal protection of confidential information provided
by the laws of the Cayman Islands, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld contempt penalties against a nonresident alien. Having
been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury while present in the
United States, the nonresident alien refused to answer questions relating
to an investigation into possible tax law violations. 133  After examining
the relevant provisions of the foreign statute protecting the privacy of
financial transactions, the court found that under Cayman law no privi-
lege against the disclosure of bank records was available "in investiga-
tions instituted by legal authority." '134 The court then refused to
recognize the alien's privilege claim because the information sought by
the grand jury would have been obtainable by Cayman public authorities
for their own investigations. The court concluded that "[s]ince the gen-
eral rule appears to be that for domestic investigations such information
would be obtainable, we find it difficult to understand how the bank's
customer's right of privacy would be significantly infringed simply be-
cause the investigating body is a foreign tribunal."' 135 The court thereby
rejected the suggestion to extend a foreign privilege beyond its statutory
130 Id. at 40.
131 Id.; Hauser, Aktvelle Fragen zum schweizerischen Bankgeheimnis, 1985 JURISTENZEITUNG
871, 875-76 (the majority of Swiss cantons do not recognize a banker's privilege in civil proceedings).
See also Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, supra note 121, at 34.
132 Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d at 41.
133 United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 946. See also Note,
Federal Judicial Compulsion of an Alien Testimony Contrary to the Mandate of the Laws of his Native
Land, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357 (1977).
134 United States v. Field, 532 F.2d at 408.
135 Id. A similar case in which the limitations of the Cayman Islands secrecy laws were empha-
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scope under the legal system concerned only because disclosure was
sought by a United States court.
This test was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in a case concerning a discovery conflict between a United States tax
and narcotics investigation and the secrecy laws of the Bahamas.136 The
court examined the privilege claim under the Bahamian Banks and Trust
Companies Regulations Act'3 7 and held that a court of the Bahamas
would be able to order production of the confidential documents sought
by the grand jury. The court emphasized that "[lt is incongruous to
suggest that a United States court afford greater protection to the cus-
tomer's right of privacy than would a Bahamian court," and concluded
that the statute in question was "hardly a blanket guarantee of
privacy.
' 138
In United States v. First National Bank of Chicago,139 the defendant
challenged an Internal Revenue Service summons on the ground that
compliance with the summons would subject the bank's employees in
Greece, who were to provide the requested documents, to substantial
criminal penalties under Greek law. Although the main issue in this case
was the question of whether criminal law sanctions under Greek law
were a bar to the United States discovery proceedings, the court held that
the Greek Bank Secrecy Act prevailed over the Internal Revenue Service
summons. The court thereby recognized the relevance of the foreign law
with respect to United States discovery rules."4 Since Article 2, Section
3, of the Greek act furnishes an unqualified privilege to bank employees
to refuse testimony concerning bank deposits even if the depositor con-
sents to disclosure, 4' the court's decision implies a recognition of this
foreign privilege with regard to United States discovery proceedings.
In a case involving grand jury proceedings concerning violations of
United States narcotics laws, 142 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reaffirmed the principle that secrecy privileges are to be recog-
nized only within the limits provided by the foreign law. 143 The court
sized is described in Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20
INT'L LAW. 1209, 1232-33 (1986).
136 United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1119 (1983).
137 Id. at 1386 n.2.
138 Id. at 1391.
139 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
140 Id. at 346.
141 Id. at 344 n.2.
142 United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985).
143 Id. at 827 n.15.
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emphasized two important qualifications to the recognition of foreign
privileges. First, the court excluded a recognition in those cases where
foreign secrecy laws are used to conceal criminal activities and to shield
incriminating evidence related to these activities from United States
courts and law enforcement authorities. 1" Second, the court rejected the
argument that United States nationals, as distinguished from foreign na-
tionals, could rely upon these legal protections. The court stated that:
[E]ven if the Cayman Islands had an absolute right to privacy, this right
could not fully apply to American citizens. The interest of American citi-
zens in the privacy of their bank records is substantially reduced when bal-
anced against the interests of their own government engaged in a criminal
investigation since they are required to report those transactions to the
United States.... 145
These principles were subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. 46
In 1984, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
addressed a discovery dispute relating to Hong Kong bank secrecy rights
and proceedings against foreign defendants. 47 The court also consid-
ered, inter alia, a motion to compel a party "to waive any rights it may
have under Hong Kong bank secrecy laws." '148 The court rejected this
motion, holding that "no court has ever compelled a foreign citizen or
corporation to waive rights conferred upon it by foreign law." 149
Finally, various federal courts have affirmed the position that denies
the protection of foreign privileges to United States citizens under inves-
tigation for violation of United States laws. These cases have been de-
cided in connection with a new legal concept formulated by United
States law enforcement authorities in the field of tax investigations. In
order to overcome the resistance of foreign banks to reveal information
about their United States customers, the United States government has
been successful in compelling United States citizens to sign "consent di-
rectives." These "consent directives" authorize foreign banks to comply
with discovery orders designed to obtain confidential bank records for
the purposes of investigations in the United States. The first appellate
court that addressed this "forced waiver" concept was the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit.150 In this case, the government sought to
144 Id. at 827, 829.
145 Id. at 828.
146 United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
147 Garpeg Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
148 Id. at 797.
149 Id. at 799.
150 United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); Fried-
man & Wilson, supra note 21, at 407-09.
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obtain the production of bank records located in the Cayman Islands for
the purposes of an investigation into possible violations of United States
tax laws. The Cayman Islands Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law '5 raised the question as to whether the subpoena was enforceable.
The government, however, obtained a District Court order compelling
the plaintiff to sign a directive instructing his foreign bank to comply
with United States discovery orders relating to his bank accounts. 15 2 The
Court of Appeals upheld this order and rejected the plaintiff's claim of
privilege under the foreign legal system. The plaintiff cited the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Payner: "foreign bank secrecy laws
provide no privacy rights for United States citizens that are not otherwise
present under the Constitution and laws of the United States." ' 3
Following this decision, the District Court for the Northern District
of New York held, in a similar case, that the United States plaintiff had
not acquired "any rights under foreign bank secrecy laws... cognizable
in United States courts."' 54 The same conclusion was reached the same
year by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in two other tax inves-
tigation cases.' 55
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
Even the almost universally recognized attorney-client privilege has
given rise to discovery disputes in international antitrust cases. The rea-
son is that the scope of this privilege may differ from one legal system to
the other. For example, the work product of the attorney, i.e. the mate-
rial gathered in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial,'5 6
enjoys only qualified immunity under United States law and the protec-
tion ceases with the termination of the litigation.'57 Further, under
United States law, the privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential com-
munications made by the client ceases to exist as soon as it is waived by
the client.15' In contrast to this rule, under French law, the attorney
retains the privilege to refuse disclosure of information received in his
151 Id. at 816.
152 Id. at 815.
153 Id. at 817 n.5.
154 United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
155 United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Thier, 767 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1985).
156 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
157 Developments, supra note 44, at 1027-46. In addition, work product immunity does not "apply
to the names and addresses of persons having knowledge of relevant facts... In]or does it apply to
existence, description, nature, custody, condition or location of documents." Butler v. United States,
226 F. Supp. 341, 343 (D. Mo. 1964).
158 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). A frequently cited formulation of the
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professional capacity even when the client has waived his rights.159 The
notion of an independent privilege is especially important,"6 but gener-
ally overlooked. Even in case of a waiver of the privilege by the client,
the attorney for competitive or other reasons may have an independent
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain communications.
Also, the foreign attorney-client privilege may extend to the identity of
the person seeking legal advice as well as to the fact of the consultation,
as is the case under German law.
161
The issue of a foreign attorney-client privilege in United States anti-
trust discovery proceedings was briefly addressed in one of the Uranium
parameters of the United States attorney-client privilege is set forth in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.
See also Benckiser GmbH v. Hygrade Food Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999, 1001-02 (D.N.J. 1966); Merri-
field, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus. LAW. 1583, 1609-10
(1977)(United States attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting).
159 A.M. & S. v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. CL L. Rep. 1616, 1632 para. (ii)(Opinion of Advocate
General Warner). Under French law, the attorney is the holder of the secret and is entitled to decide
according to his/her conscience and interests whether, and if so, to what extent confidential commu-
nications are revealed. The attorney retains the privilege even if the client consents to disclosure
(Report by D.A.O. Edward, Q.C.). Under German law the privilege extends also to the identity of
the client and the fact of the consultation as well as to knowledge relating to documents. Report by
D.A.O. Edward, Q.C., Commission Consulative des Barreaux de la Communaut6 Europ6enne, at
18-19. Under English law, the attorney-client privilege extends to information received by the attor-
ney, in his or her professional capacity, from third parties. In re Sarah Getty Trust, [1985] 3 W.L.R.
302, 307, 310 (Q.B.).
For a discussion of the legal professional privilege under Irish law see Silver Hill Duckling v.
Minister for Agriculture, 1987 ILRM 516. For the legal professional privilege under European
Community law, see Burkhard, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Multina-
tional Corporate Counsel, 20 INT'L LAW. 677 (1986). For a discussion of the A.M& S. decision of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see Kreis, Commission Procedures in Competition
Proceedings, Recent Reforms in Practice and Law, ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COR-
PORATE LAW INSTITUTE 145 (B. Hawk ed. 1983).
160 Another example for an independant privilege is the catholic clergyman privilege under Ger-
man law. Catholic ministers may still refuse to testify even if the communicant has given consent to
disclosure: Concordat between the German Reich and the Holy See, Sept. 12, 1933, 2 RGBL 681
Art. 9.
161 Judgment of November 29, 1950, Oberlandesgericht, Duesseldorf, 5 MDR 681 (1951); Judg-
ment of March 2, 1966, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 19 NJW 1664; Judgment of December 28,
1984, Oberlandesgericht Duesseldorf, 38 MDR 507 (1985).
Notaries: Judgment of July 13, 1965, Oberlandesgericht Saarbruecken, 18 NJW 2114 (1965);
Judgment of May 12, 1981, Obeflandesgericht Muenchen, 35 MDR 853-54 (1981). Tax advisers:
Judgment of April 20, 1983, BGH, 38 MDR 48; Judgment of October 18, 1982, Oberlandesgericht
Stuttgart, 37 MDR 236 (1983).
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cases.162 The District Court, however, deferred consideration of the de-
fendants objections to the production of the confidential documents con-
cerned. 163 The court's ruling on that privilege claim, if ever made, has
not been reported.
In another antitrust case, 64 the United States plaintiff moved for an
order compelling production of certain confidential documents which
were withheld by Remy Martin on the ground of an attorney-client privi-
lege. The evidence at issue consisted of business and legal communica-
tions between officials of the defendant and employees who were
identified as the defendant's French in-house counsel. In its opinion, the
District Court distinguished the documents located in the defendant's
French offices from those located in its office in New York.165 Regarding
the documents located in France, the District Court applied the Hague
Evidence Convention and held that, according to Article 11 of the Con-
vention, both United States and French law relating to the attorney-cli-
ent privilege were applicable. However, for the documents located in the
United States, the court did not simply apply the law of the forum to
determine whether the communications were privileged under United
States law. Rather, the court relied upon choice-of-law principles in or-
der to determine whether United States or French privilege law ap-
plied.166 The court held that the United States had the most significant
relationship with the communications and concluded therefore that the
confidential documents in question were privileged under United States
law. 
167
Whether the approach taken by the District Court as to the docu-
ments located in the United States was correct may be open to question.
The significant aspect of this opinion is that the court recognized the
existence of the privilege problem and the necessity to make a choice as
to the level of legal protection to be accorded to certain foreign confiden-
tiality interests.
The accommodating approach taken by United States courts to-
wards assertions of attorney-client privileges based upon foreign law is
further evidenced by the decision in Graco v. Kremlin.1 68 In this patent
162 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
163 Id. at 1156.
164 Renfield Corp. v. Remy Martin S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
165 Id. at 443.
166 Id. at 444.
167 Id. at 445.
168 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The court emphasized the principle of comity in transna-
tional discovery proceedings: "Even where there is no conflict with a foreign law, courts are well
advised to proceed cautiously any time they order discovery involving activity within another coun-
try." Id. at 510 n.9.
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infringement suit the United States plaintiff moved to compel answers to
interrogatories and production of documents. Among the objections
raised by the French defendant against these discovery requests was the
attorney-client privilege. 169 While the District Court ordered the de-
fendant to comply with most of the discovery requests 170 including an
interrogatory concerning "legal advice [the defendant] may have re-
ceived," '171 the court's ruling on the various discovery devices were "sub-
ject to a successful assertion ...of the attorney-client privilege. "
172
Although it is not clear whether the privilege claim was based upon
French or United States law, the arguments advanced by the defendant
against disclosure indicated a reliance on principles of French law.17
This proposition was not rejected by the court because it gave the defend-
ant "one more opportunity to perfect its assertion of privilege."' 7 4 The
recognition of the French attorney-client privilege that can be implied
from this ruling placed the burden on the defendant to substantiate and
specify the privilege claim on both factual and legal grounds. The princi-
ple that a party who raises "an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country" 7 5 carries the burden of proof on that account has been empha-
sized by United States courts on various occasions.
176
C. Transactional Communications
Patent litigation is another area where discovery conflicts have
arisen because of different levels of legal protection accorded under
United States and foreign law as regards confidential business communi-
cations between patent advisers and their clients. As the cases described
show, United States courts have consistently refused to extend the attor-
ney-client privilege to patent agents. Contrary to the restrictive doctrine
of professional adviser privileges under United States law,'7 7 Section 104
of the British Patent Act of 1977 grants privilege protection to patent
169 Id. at 507.
170 Id. at 527-30. The District Court set a deadline so as to allow the defendant to perfect its
claim of attorney-client privilege.
171 Id. at 529.
172 Id. at 516.
173 Id. Upon Graco's request that assertion of privilege be supported by some identification of
the documents claimed to be protected, Kremlin took the position that the identifying information
itself was privileged. Id.
174 Id. at 517.
175 See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
176 In re Investigation World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1952); Bamberger v.
Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ohio v. Arthur Anderson, 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
177 Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professional&- Its Implications
for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 (1962).
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agents. The same rule applies in Germany according to Section 383 of
the German Code of Civil Procedure. This provision contains, inter alia,
a privilege to refuse testimony on matters entrusted to a person in an
official, occupational or professional capacity provided that the facts in
question are confidential either by virtue of a statutory rule or because of
their nature. The code does not mention any profession in this provision,
but it has never been contested that this privilege applies to lawyers,
bankers, accountants, insurance agents, investment and tax advisers, as
well as other independent professions which maintain confidential rela-
tionships with their clients. 7 '
In Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken Inc. ,179 an antitrust case,
requests were made for the production of confidential business communi-
cations in possession of a French patent adviser. These discovery re-
quests were challenged on the ground that the documents were privileged
because they contained professional advice relating to the preparation
and the conduct of patent litigation.8 0 The District Court did not reject
this claim on the ground that such a privilege was not available under
United States law. Instead, the Court looked to French law in order to
determine whether the facts alleged justified the claim of an attorney-
client privilege.18' The District Court concluded that the requirements
for this privilege under French law were not satisfied 2 and that the doc-
uments had to be disclosed.1
8 3
Two years later, the same District Court had to deal with similar
problems raised by the same litigants. 184 Again, the claim was made that
written communications with French and British patent agents were pro-
tected from disclosure because of the privileges provided by Article 378
of the French Penal Code and Section 15(1) of the British Civil Evidence
Act. 8 5 Initially, the District Court rejected the availability of the United
States attorney-client privilege to these foreign advisers (who were not
members of the French or British bar) as being "in contravention of the
public policy of the United States as enunciated in the Federal Rules of
178 Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1238; Shemanski, supra note 6, at 486; Stuerner, supra note 68, at
453-54.
179 370 F. Supp. 761 (D.S.C. 1972).
180 Id. at 763-64.
181 Id. at 765.
182 Id. at 766.
183 Id. at 768.
184 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974). See also Henry,
Pretrial Discovery in USA: Extraterritorial Einfluss auf Durchsetzung und Benutzung von gewer-
blichen Schutzrechten, 1983 GRUR Int. 82, 85.
185 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1170.
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Civil Procedure." ' 6 The court's decision, however, distinguished two
different kinds of documents as regards their protection by a patent ad-
viser privilege. The court stated that "any communications touching
base with the United States will be governed by the federal discovery
rules while any communications related to matters solely involving
France or Great Britain will be governed by the applicable foreign{ stat-
ute. The principle of comity applies."18 7  Accordingly, the District
Court proceeded to an examination of the different types of communica-
tions which were claimed to be privileged and distinguished between doc-
uments relating to United States patent proceedings and those
concerning patent applications in foreign countries.
1 88
In 1978, another District Court followed this distinction in an anti-
trust case where discovery of patent agent communications was sought
relating to patent activities both in the United States and in the United
Kingdom.18 9 The court refused to apply foreign privilege rules regarding
patent activities in the United States, but recognized that British privi-
leges were applicable with respect to patent activities in the United King-
dom. The court concluded that:
Because the communications involving patent agents relate to patent activi-
ties in different countries, the Court must determine which patent agent
privilege rule governs for each particular communication. For this determi-
nation, the Court will follow the well-accepted rule that while no law has of
its own force any effect outside the territory of the state or nation from
which its authority is derived, foreign laws may, within certain limits, be
given efct.... Comity, however, will not be extended to foreign law if it is
contrary to the public policy of the forum .... Therefore, because the
United States has a strong interest in regulating activities that involve its
own patent laws, all communications relating to patent activities in the
United States will be governed by the American rule. However, the United
States has no such strong interest for patent agent communications relating
to patent activities in Great Britain, so that deference will be given to the
British rule. For communications relating to patent activities in other
countries, no privilege will be granted as the defendants have failed to indi-
cate what the applicable privilege is, if indeed any exists. 190
The court then examined the British Civil Evidence Act of 1968191
and determined the scope of the patent agent privilege according to the
186 Id. at 1169 (emphasizing that United States patent advisers do not enjoy the attorney-client
privilege and that therefore the same rule applies to foreign patent advisers).
187 Id. at 1169-70.
188 Id. at 1170-71.
189 In re Ampidillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
190 Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
191 Id. at 392.
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provisions of the foreign statute. 192 Two years later, the principles un-
derlying this ruling were adopted by the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio.193 This case concerned two patent actions. The United
States plaintiff sought a discovery order compelling the production of
confidential business documents which had been generated by a
chartered British patent agent advising a British company on questions
relating to intellectual property rights. The court's holding that no privi-
lege could be claimed to oppose the discovery order was based upon an
analysis of whether the Civil Evidence Act of 1968 or the Act of 197719'
of the United Kingdom provided a privilege for the communications con-
cerned.195 Since no privilege attached to the communications under Brit-
ish law, no privilege was available for recognition.
196
These decisions established the principle that privileges enjoyed by
foreign patent advisers are to be recognized in United States discovery
proceedings. However, the limitation regarding communications not
"touching base with the United States" 19 7 and "patent activities"
abroad 98 raises the problem of how to define United States and foreign
advisory functions. The courts seemed to be prepared to examine in
detail the documentary material in question so as to make this
determination.
D. Medical Records
The doctor-patient privilege is another example of divergent levels
of confidentiality protection in discovery proceedings. For example,
under French law the doctor enjoys an absolute privilege to refuse disclo-
sure of evidence relating to patients even if the person concerned has
waived the protection accorded to this relationship. In addition, the
privilege extends to the identity of the patient. 199 In a United States tort
192 Id. at 394.
193 Mead Digital Systems v. A.B. Dick Co., 89 F.R.D. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980). See also Menden-
hall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
194 Patent Act, 1977, ch.37, § 104; Myrick & Love, Obtaining Evidence Abroad for Use in United
States Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 585, 603-04 (1981).
195 Mead Digital Systems, 89 F.R.D. at 320.
196 Id. at 321.
197 Deering Milliken, 397 F. Supp at 1169.
198 Ampicillin Antitrust, 81 F.RD. at 391.
199 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the I lth Session of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 811-12 (1969); Nagel, Das Berufsgeheimnis der
Aerzte im Zivilprozess auf internationaler Ebene, 55 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZErruNG 33, 34 (1977);
Note, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters - A
Comparison with Federal Rules Procedures, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT. L. 365, 394 n.130 (1981). See also
Struve, supra note 97, at 1112.
For the German doctor-patient privilege see judgment of April 10, 1956, LG Koeln, 1956 NJW
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action for asbestos poisoning, the plaintiff's motion to compel the pro-
duction of confidential documents relating to medical examinations of
employees was opposed by the defendant corporation on the ground of a
medical records privilege.2 °" The medical files were located in Canada.
As regards this privilege claim, the court held that Pennsylvania law
"would look to the privilege law of Quebec where the doctor-patient rela-
tionships... arose." Under Pennsylvania privilege law, the information
requested was not privileged. 20 1 The court concluded, however, that the
defendant, who carried the burden of proving the foreign privilege, was
unable to establish a medical records privilege under Quebec law.202
E. Foreign Government Secrets
Finally, the government secrets privilege has been at issue in a
number of international discovery disputes. Under United States law,
the government secrets privilege protects the state secrets involving mili-
tary or diplomatic information,20 3 and government information including
the identity of informers and internal management material relating to
deliberative processes.204 In addition, executive officers may refuse to
testify or to produce documentary evidence in certain situations.20 5
1112, and judgment of February 14, 1979, LG Hanau, 1979 NJW 2357. Protection extends to the
doctor's documents: Judgments of July 4, 1984, May 31, 1983, and November 23, 1982, BGH, 1984,
MDR 919, 1984 MDR 132-33 and 1983 MDR 298. Psychologists enjoy the same privilege, Kaiser,
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Dzplompsychologen, 1971 NJW 491-94. The doctor-patient privilege
has also been recognized by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. See Moli v.
Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1971, and Mollett v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 897.
200 Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
201 Id. at 35.
202 Id.
203 In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953), Vinson, C.J., referring to the privilege
against revealing military secrets, said: "Judicial experience with the privilege which protects mili-
tary and state secrets has been limited in this country .... The privilege belongs to the Government
and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be
lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer." See also
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
For protection of diplomatic secrets see Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), affid, 384 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert denied 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
204 For protection of the administrative process and government deliberations, see Mobil Oil Co.
v. Dep't of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414, 416 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
The "deliberative process privilege" concerning administrative opinions, reasonings, and con-
clusions is a qualified privilege and the agency has to substantiate such a claim. Exxon Corp. v.
Dep't of Energy, 91 F.RID. 26 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
205 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nader v. Butz, 60 F.R.D. 381 (D.D.C. 1973).
Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1974); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879, 881 (1962).
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In the context of international discovery proceedings where a "pub-
lic interest" privilege is invoked, several situations have to be distin-
guished. First, a foreign government which is not subject to foreign
sovereign immunity or which has waived the protection of sovereign im-
munity may still be entitled to claim a government secrets privilege with
regard to certain information according to United States law or pursuant
to a similar privilege granted by its own law."0 6 Second, foreign parties
or non-party witnesses requested to testify or to produce documents in
civil discovery proceedings in the United States may claim protection
under a foreign government secrets privilege. Although the privilege is
not private in nature under United States law, under some foreign legal
systems private litigants enjoy the right to invoke this privilege in civil
litigation. For example, in England and Canada, the Crown privilege
may not only be claimed by the executive, 0 7 but also by private
litigants. 0 8
Third, it is important to distinguish a state secret privilege claim
raised by an United States defendant but based upon a foreign origin or
source from a claim raised by a foreign defendant supported by the state
secret law of another country. This distinction is emphasized in the rul-
ing of the U.S. Court of International Trade in Republic Steel Corp. v.
United States.0 9 In this countervailing duty case, the federal defendant
invoked a state secret privilege with regard to administrative documents
submitted by the Government of Brazil and the World Bank to the
206 The privilege of a foreign government to withhold official information or papers has been
recognized in a number of cases: Crosby v. Pacific S.S. Lines 133 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1943), cert
denied, 319 U.S. 752; Kessler v. Best, 121 F. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1903). In the latter case, documents
which were part of the archives of the German consultate were held to be privileged. Upon motion
to compel a witness to answer cross-questions, it was held that the privilege was that of the German
government, not of the witness. See also Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34
STAN. L. REv. 385, 413-14 nn.150, 151 (1982).
Article 47 of the West German Constitution (Grundgesetz) gives members of Parliament a
privilege to refuse disclosure of matters relating to their official activities.
207 Hardin, supra note 205, at 880 n.4 ("The British courts have supported the right of the execu-
tive or minister to decide what information should be kept secret in the public interest.")
208 For the Crown privilege in the United Kingdom and Canada see Comment, Discovery in Great
Britain: The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 11 CORNELL INT. L.J. 323, 337
(1978); Wood & Carrera, supra note 103, at 93.
In England, the Crown privilege is normally asserted by the executive department concerned
but may be raised by the parties. The privilege is applicable where disclosure would be harmful to
national defense or to good diplomatic relations. See House of Lords in Conway v. Rimmer (1968)
A.C. 910. For a review of the history of the privilege, see Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England, (1979)
1 W.L.R. 473, 489-93. For the executive privilege under Irish law, see Murphy v. Mayor of Dublin,
(1972) I.R. 215, 234.
209 578 F. Supp. 409 (C.I.T. 1983). Taylor & Vermulst, Disclosure of Confidential Information in
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings Under United States Law, 21 INT'L LAW. 43, 62-
63 (1987).
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United States Department of Commerce. The court applied United
States principles relating to the state secret privilege and rejected the sug-
gestion that a mere desire of a foreign sovereign or an international
agency automatically qualified the information concerned as privilege
under the standards and criteria of United States law.21°
The following case shows how those privilege conflicts have been
resolved where foreign law was at issue. In the course of investigations
concerning antitrust violations by world-wide operating oil corporations,
a number of grand jury subpoenas were served on these corporations re-
quiring, inter alia, the production of confidential communications be-
tween the defendants and foreign government authorities.211 The D.C.
District Court rejected the corporation's claim of privilege and held that
the privilege was "one that must be asserted by the foreign sovereign"
and that it could "not be claimed by a party for his'own benefit, particu-
larly so when the party is not a national of the sovereign involved." '212
This holding was affirmed in Republic of China v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co.
213
These opinions, however, left the question unanswered as to whether
a foreign sovereign or one of its instrumentalities, having consented to
United States jurisdiction, or being amenable to local suit under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act214 because of the commercial character of
the action involved,21 would still be entitled to claim a government
secrets privilege based upon its own domestic law. The distinction be-
tween the question of whether there is jurisdiction, and of whether - once
jurisdiction is established - a foreign sovereign is still entitled to claim
privileges based upon its domestic legal system, is very important. The
following decision has addressed this problem.
In 1984 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
addressed a discovery dispute where the foreign plaintiff invoked a gov-
ernment privilege against the discovery of confidential documents con-
cerning French interministerial, i.e., interdepartmental, deliberations
sought by the United States defendant.216 First, the court affirmed that
such governmental deliberations may enjoy protection under United
States lairv, but held that the claim was "neither described nor justified
210 Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. at 413.
211 In re Investigation World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.1952).
212 Id. at 286.
213 142 F. Supp. 551, 556 (D. Md. 1956).
214 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2),(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
215 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
216 Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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with sufficient particularity." '217 Second, as regards the objection to dis-
covery on the ground of French law, the court held that no privilege
could be asserted because the French statute in question concerned only
the release of information to foreign public authorities. 218 The court thus
distinguished between a privilege of general applicability and a blocking
statute directed against foreign discovery requests. It implied that the
former were to be recognized by a United States court. The court also
supported this implication by its comments in a footnote that "even if the
privilege had been properly invoked, the Court would likely have been
inclined to find that COFACE [Campagnie Francaise Assurance, the
plaintiff], by instituting this action, waived the privilege. ' 219 The court
thereby reaffirmed the principle that a foreign plaintiff in a United States
court may not avail himself of privileges not provided by the law of that
forum.
It should also be noted that not only federal law but also state law
has recognized the principle that foreign legal privileges not available
under United States law may be asserted by a foreign litigant against
United States discovery orders. In Ghana Supply Commission v. New
England Power Co. ("NEPCO"), 220 the Massachusetts District Court
ruled on challenges raised by the foreign plaintiff to the defendant's dis-
covery motions on the ground of executive privilege.221 The ruling of the
court that no foreign executive privilege could be recognized was ex-
pressed in the following terms: "the Republic of Ghana, by instituting
this civil action. . ., has waived any privilege it might have otherwise had
to prevent disclosure of information sought by NEPCO that is material
to NEPCO's defense.
222
X. COMMENTS REGARDING THE RECOGNITION OF PRIVILEGES
The above described judicial opinions concerning the problem of
privilege recognition were not based upon established legal doctrines or a
comprehensive approach as to how foreign legal obstacles should be dealt
with in United States discovery proceedings. Instead, they reflect a cau-
tious case-by-case analysis. This judicial evolution towards a recognition
of foreign privileges is partly reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Re-
lations Law and coincides with positions taken by the Securities and Ex-
217 Id. at 25.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 83 F.R.D. 586 (D. Mass. 1979).
221 Id. at 592.
222 Id. at 594.
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change Commission and the American Bar Association in two particular
privilege areas. To complete this survey of non-judicial comments on
foreign privileges two resolutions adopted by international organizations
will be mentioned. They indicate general consensus as to the special na-
ture of privileges in the field of transnational antitrust investigations.
Again, none of these comments, propositions or positions attempts to
suggest a legal theory regarding the problem of privilege recognition.
Rather, they express specific concerns and evaluations of certain areas of
discovery conflicts. However, taken together these sources provide aca-
demic and official support for the development of a comprehensive set of
criteria upon which privilege recognition should be granted or refused.
A. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law contains a brief refer-
ence to privileged matters.223 The Restatement mainly focuses on dis-
covery conflicts arising from blocking statutes:
A communication privileged where made - for instance confidential testi-
mony given to a foreign government investigation under assurance of privi-
lege - would not be subject to discovery in a U.S. court, in the absence of
waiver by those entitled to the privilege. If communications were made in
more than one state - for instance, by letter or international telephone - the
privilege would ordinarily be determined by the law of the state most
closely linked to the subject of the communication.224
This statement is not further developed by the reporter's notes. It does
not expressly address the general problem of whether foreign legal privi-
leges which are not available under United States federal law may be
recognized in United States discovery proceedings, but limits itself to
certain kinds of confidential communications. The statement cited above
does, however, answer the important question as to which country's priv-
ilege rules are to be applied if more than one country is concerned by a
transnational communication.
As far as the problem of conflicts between foreign and United States
privilege rules is concerned, the following statement relating to the more
general question of how to determine the "relevant foreign and U.S. in-
terests" should be cited:
In making its determination, the court or agency will look.., to the way
that confidentiality or disclosure fits into the regulation by the foreign state
of the activity in question, and to reflections of the foreign state's concern
for confidentiality in laws existing prior to the start of the controversy in
223 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 437 comment d (1986)C'Discovery and For-
eign Government Compulsion").
224 Id. § 437 comment c.
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connection with which the information is sought.
225
The Restatement's position, which is based upon an interest analy-
sis, thereby embraces the principle that foreign privileges may be taken
into account in United States discovery proceedings. The Restatement,
however, gives no indication as to the circumstances under which foreign
privileges not available in the United States are to be recognized.
B. Securities and Exchange Commission
As far as official statements of the United States Government on the
problem of privilege recognition are concerned, the position taken by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as regards foreign bank
secrecy law opposing United States investigations into possible violations
of United States securities laws is of particular interest. Even more than
the law enforcement authorities in antitrust matters, the SEC has en-
countered increasing difficulties in obtaining documentary evidence lo-
cated abroad and relating to fraudulent international securities
transactions. In order to overcome legal challenges to its discovery sub-
poenas on the ground of foreign legal protections of confidential informa-
tion, the SEC has suggested the "waiver by conduct" concept.226
This concept is related to the "forced waiver" doctrine which has
been applied by United States courts to deal with refusals to provide evi-
dence relating to bank accounts located in countries with special secrecy
protection.227 It was held that judicial compulsion in order to force a
holder of a foreign bank account to relinquish the privilege enjoyed
under foreign laws does not amount to a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.228
The "waiver by conduct" concept imposes an assumption that the
purchase or sale of securities in the United States constitutes an implied
waiver of the applicability of foreign secrecy laws protecting information
relating to such a transaction. The person concerned, though enjoying
foreign nondisclosure rights, would be regarded as consenting to any fu-
ture discovery requests emanating from United States law enforcement
authorities relating to investigations into securities transactions con-
225 Id. § 437 comment d.
226 Fedders, supra note 122, at 106-07; Request for Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve
the Commission's Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons who Purchase or Sell Securities in
the U.S. Markets from Other Countries, Release No. 21186, File No. S7-27-84, July 30, 1984, 16
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1305 (1984). See also Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, supra note 121,
at 3-4. Haseltine, supra note 121, at 310-11.
227 Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 407-09.
228 United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 819. Anwarter, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in
the Cayman Islands, 9 FORDHAM INT'L LJ., 680, 700 (1986).
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nected with the United States. An early formulation of this concept can
be found in United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Informa-
tion Center Inc.229 In this case, Judge Walsh ordered Swiss companies
doing business in the United States through affiliated organizations to
answer interrogatories despite asserted penalties to which the defendants
would be liable under the Swiss Penal Code. The court entered an order
for the defendants to answer and held that:
Now that is the choice defendants must make (i.e., whether to subject them-
selves to the jurisdiction of a country by doing -business there) and it is a
choice which confronts all people who do business in foreign countries, and
many times existing in the forum in which the litigation arises. After all,
we can't be expected to yield to laws of all the various countries of the
world, and we would not expect them to yield to ours.230
The "waiver-by-conduct" concept, i.e., the non-availability of for-
eign privileges in United States securities discovery proceedings, is based
upon two premises. First, the SEC proposition recognizes implicitly for-
eign privileges based upon secrecy laws, because it assumes that unless
such a privilege is waived, the foreign person under investigation is under
no obligation to comply with United States discovery orders. At the
same time, the concept purports to provide a legal basis for foreign banks
or other institutions holding the confidential information to release the
evidence requested without violating their contractual duties towards
their customers. The implied recognition of the foreign national's privi-
lege coincides with a great number of court decisions mentioned earlier.
Second, the SEC concept assumes that an implied waiver is valid
under the foreign legal system concerned. Since the existence of a foreign
privilege is determined by foreign law, the same legal system must an-
swer the question of whether the privilege has been validly waived. If the
foreign law concerned does not consider mere conduct as a sufficient dec-
laration as regards the waiver of a legal right, the foreign privilege would
continue to exist.
C. American Bar Association
As far as comments and opinions of private institutions on the issue
of privilege recognition are concerned, the position taken by the Ameri-
229 Hansen, The Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws by the Dept of Justice, 11
A.B.A. Sec. ANTITRUST 75, 86 (1957)(quoting United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Infor-
mation Center, No. 96-170 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 19, 1957)(order demanding answer to interrogatories).
See also Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Mari-
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can Bar Association ("ABA") on the recognition of attorney-client privi-
leges in an international context merits attention. The ABA statement
followed the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities in the case A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v. Commission.231 This case
concerned the scope of the investigative powers of the Commission of the
European Communities in antitrust matters according to article 14(1) of
EEC Regulation No. 17.
Neither the Regulation nor the Statute of the Court of Justice con-
tain provisions exempting confidential business information from com-
pulsory disclosure on privilege grounds, not even regarding the privilege
against self-incrimination. However, the Court of Justice held that the
corporation under investigation was entitled to refuse disclosure of those
business records that were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The
court based its recognition of this privilege upon general principles of law
common to the laws of all Member States232 but limited the privilege to
independent lawyers from Community Member States.233
The fact that in-house lawyers as well as lawyers from non-Commu-
nity countries were excluded from the benefits of this judgment was criti-
cized by the ABA. It requested the Commission to accord a client's
written communications with a United States lawyer the same proce-
dural protections against disclosure as a client's correspondence with a
Community lawyer.2 34 Among the reasons invoked by the ABA the fol-
lowing argument is particularly interesting: the ABA states that United
States courts and antitrust enforcement agencies draw no distinction be-
tween United States and foreign lawyers when faced with a claim of at-
torney-client privilege. Therefore, as a matter of comity, the
Commission should accord clients with confidential communications to
or from United States lawyers the same right.2 35 According to the ABA,
"United States courts recognize that, to maintain order and stability
within the international community, they must in appropriate circum-
stances accommodate the rights and privileges afforded by foreign legal
231 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575. Christoforou, Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competi-
tion Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 1986 LEGAL IsSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 1.
232 A.M.& S. Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, 1611.
233 Id. at 1611, 1612.
234 Report from the European Law Committee, ABA International Law and Practice Section
(Feb. 1983)[hereinafter Report]. The exclusion of in-house from the protection of confidentiality has
also been criticized by European observers. See Ghandi, Legal Professional Privilege in European
Community Law, 1982 EUR. L. REv. 308, 313; Lasok, AMaS-The Court Decides, 1982 EUR. CT. L.
REPORT 99, 102-03; Forrester, Legal Professional Privilege, 1983 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 75, 82.
235 Report, supra note 234, at 9. Under English law, foreign legal advisers are in the same posi-
tion (for the purposes of legal professional privilege) as are English lawyers. Law Reports-Court of
Appeal, Great Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Hane Insurance Co., The Times (London), Feb. 3, 1981.




With regard to the recognition of an attorney-client privilege involv-
ing a foreign lawyer, the ABA report assumes that no court or antitrust
enforcement agency would apply a different privilege rule to communica-
tions with a foreign lawyer who is not admitted to the bar of a State of
the United States.237 On the other hand, the report assumes that the
limitations as to the scope of the United States privilege that apply to a
communication with a United States lawyer also apply to a communica-
tion with a foreign lawyer. As an example, the report cites the case
where the client waives the protection of the privilege.238 This statement
seems to be inconsistent with the preceding assertion that United States
law would recognize a foreign attorney-client privilege. For example, in
a case where according to foreign law the attorney retains his privilege
not to disclose documentary evidence despite a waiver by his client, such
an independent attorney privilege would not be recognized under United
States laW.
The case law cited by the ABA concerning privileged communica-
tions with foreign patent agents seems to be more consistent with the
assertion that United States law is not hostile to the idea of recognizing
foreign privileges.2 39 The report emphasizes that United States courts
have refused to order the production of communications with foreign
patent agents when the law of the foreign country provided a privilege
for those communications.240 This favorable approach adopted by
United States courts with regard to the recognition of foreign privileges
in the field of patent counseling has been described earlier in this Article.
The question remains regarding how United States courts would
deal with a situation in which the law of the country where the foreign
attorney resides provides for a wider attorney-client privilege than is
available under United States law. This is not a theoretical question, but
an issue of considerable practical importance. Since the interests of the
attorney and his client do not necessarily coincide, the attorney may have
his or her own interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain writ-
ten communications even though the client has waived his or her privi-
236 Report, supra note 234 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
237 Id. at 14.
238 Id. at 14 n.53.
239 Id. at 14, 15.
240 See, e-g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 953-54 (N.D. Il1. 1982). See
also BEUSCH & DECKER, DER SYNDICUSANWALT 17, 33 (1987)(The In-House Lawyer). The au-
thors discuss the reverse problem, i.e., whether a United States court would grant privilege protec-
tion to international communications between lawyers if the foreign lawyers involved could not
claim a privilege under foreign law. Id. at 35, 36.
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lege. Given the wide variety of cases which have dealt with the problem
of recognition of foreign privileges, it seems impossible to predict how a
United States court would resolve this problem.
D. International Agencies
Both the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development ("OECD") have discussed mechanisms
through which the international cooperation in antitrust matters could
be improved and have adopted resolutions regarding the exchange of
business information between antitrust enforcement authorities. How-
ever, they have not addressed the discovery of confidential commercial
data pertaining to enterprises in international judicial proceedings.
The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for
the Control of Restrictive Business Practices adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations provides as follows:
5. Where, for the purposes of the control of restrictive business practices,
a State obtains information from enterprises containing legitimate business
secrets, it should accord such information reasonable safeguards normally
applicable in this field, particularly to protect its confidentiality....
9. States should... supply to other States... publicly available informa-
tion, and, to the extent consistent with their laws and established public
policy, other information necessary to the receiving interested State for its
effective control of restrictive business practices.
2 41
These two subsections do not use the term privilege, but the refer-
ence to "business secrets" as protected by national laws indicate interna-
tional consensus as to the substantive quality of foreign non-disclosure
rights relating to confidential commercial information.
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises calls on these
enterprises "to consult and cooperate, including the provision of infor-
mation, with competent authorities of countries whose interests are di-
rectly affected in regard to competition issues or investigations"
emphasizing that the "provisions of information should be in accordance
with safeguards normally applicable in this field."242 This reference to
normal safeguards reflects the difficulty of reaching an agreement among
OECD Member States regarding a definition of those legal provisions
granting a right to refuse the disclosure of confidential business informa-
tion in the area of antitrust investigations.
However, the OECD Guidelines have been interpreted to cover
241 35th Session, Resolution 35/63, December 5, 1980, U.N. Doe. TD/RBF/CONF/10/Rev. I
§ E.
242 Adopted Aug. 9, 1978, OECD Doe. C (78)(133)(Final); see also Christoforou, supra note 231,
at 39.
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"safeguards" available under United States law as well as the laws of the
other OECD Member States,24 3 "[tior example the confidentiality of
trade secrets and competitively sensitive information, and evidentiary
privileges such as the attorney-client privilege." 2" A similar view was
expressed by J. Davidow, the then head of the Foreign Commerce Sec-
tion of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Justice Department.245
XI. REJECTION OF INTEREST BALANCING
The legal theory that foreign privileges not available under United
States law should be capable of recognition in United States discovery
proceedings raises the question as to the conditions and circumstances
under which a conflict between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
foreign legal protections is to be resolved in favor of the latter. So far,
most United States courts have resorted to a balancing of interests in
order to determine whether foreign law should prevail over United States
discovery principles. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law has at-
tempted to define this balancing test.
246
This Article rejects the interest analysis as an unreliable, biased, im-
practicable, and counterproductive device to resolve international discov-
ery conflicts, especially with regard to the problem of foreign privileges.
Instead, it proposes a certain number of criteria which seem more appro-
priate to resolve conflicts between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and foreign legal protections concerning testimonial and documentary
evidence.
The most prominent rejection of the often applied balancing test in
the field of international discovery conflicts is contained in the dissenting
opinion to the Supreme Court decision in Sociit6 Nationale Industrielle
Airospatiale: "[C]ourts are generally ill equipped to assume the role of
balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own. Although
transnational litigation is increasing, relatively few judges are exper-
ienced in the area and the procedures of foreign legal systems are often
poorly understood."'247
243 Hawk, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 241, 274-
75 (1977).
244 Id. at 275.
245 Davidow, Some Reflections on the OECD Antitrust Guidelines, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 441,455
(1977). See also Davidow., Extraterritorial Antitrust Law and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 500 (1981).
246 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 437.
247 Socit Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). See
also id. at n.3(remark emphasizing that governmental interests are "far more complicated than can
be represented by the limited parties before a court.").
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This skepticism of the four dissenting Supreme Court Justices con-
cerning the balancing of interests in order to resolve international discov-
ery conflicts has been shared by other federal courts.248 This judicial
reluctance to examine United States and foreign interests coincides with
academic criticism emphasizing that courts have not been neutral and
generally "balanced" in favor of the forum.2 4 9 Also, United States courts
have not always distinguished between conflicts concerning the extrater-
ritorial application and enforcement of substantive laws and the differ-
ences between legal systems in the area of discovery procedures.2 50
Apart from the pro-forum bias, the analysis evaluating the impor-
tance of the foreign element has been incomplete. The interest analysis
in its emphasis on official expressions of foreign concern arbitrarily
prejudices those foreign defendants or witnesses who are, for whatever
reason, unable to muster their government's support for their opposition
to United States discovery orders. As experience has shown, foreign gov-
ernments are much more likely to intervene on behalf of the interests of
large corporations. Smaller companies find it more difficult to obtain of-
ficial interventions on their behalf, especially if only private interests are
involved.2 51 In addition, since statements of foreign governments focus
on a particular international legal conflict, these positions are liable to
248 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951-55 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(Wilkey, J.); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D.
Ill. 1979)(Marshall, J.):
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate
the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a balancing test is inherently un-
workable in this case. The competing interest here display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely
the same plane of national policy.... It is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally
contradictory and mutually negating actions.
See also Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975)(balancing as a "judicial
nightmare"); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 741 (C.D. Cal. 1975)("unan-
swerable enigma").
249 See also Kahn, The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476
(1980); Anwarter, supra note 228, at 717-18; Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 1, at 620-
21; Bishop, supra note 23, at 402; Maier, supra note 98, at 296-97; Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 581-82 and 588-95 (1983)("The balancing of
interests is nothing but the assertion of the primacy of United States interest in the guise of applying
an international jurisdictional rule of reason.").
See also Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4 (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing) (criticizing the "pro-forum bias" and the "local perspective" emerging from lower court deci-
sions in international discovery conflicts).
250 Maier, supra note 98, at 298. Examples of cases where primacy of United States substantive
interests were affirmed are given by Anwarter, supra note 228, at 720 (tax, antitrust, securities laws).
251 The dissenting opinion in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560-61
(footnotes omitted), has emphasized this aspect as follows:
In addition, it simply is not reasonable to expect the Federal Government or the foreign state in
which the discovery will take place to participate in every individual case in order to articulate
the broader international and foreign interests that are relevant to the decision whether to use
the Convention. Indeed, the opportunities for such participation are limited.
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change in a different context. For this reason, the authority of such offi-
cial interventions to define foreign law is considerably diminished. The
interest test cannot be applied uniformly because official statements de-
fining national interests are not always available and often subject to
political considerations. The balancing test therefore implies the possi-
bility that foreign litigants are treated unequally. Considering these facts
it is surprising to see how readily many courts have accepted foreign
government interventions as important factors regarding the resolution
of international discovery conflicts.
An instructive example is the insufficient appreciation and disqualifi-
cation of foreign privileges252 as compared to foreign blocking statutes.
However, it has never been explained why a foreign statute designed to
obstruct United States discovery proceedings should command greater
respect in United States courts than long-standing substantive rights pro-
tecting certain types of evidence.253 It would be indeed difficult to argue
that foreign legal prohibitions concerning the taking of testimony or the
production of documents should be more highly valued because they re-
flect a greater interest in the preservation of secrecy than does the vesting
of a privilege. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the idea
that foreign litigants invoking a blocking statute might enjoy a "preferred
status" in United States discovery proceedings254 as compared to those
foreign parties or witnesses who invoke "only" a privilege applicable in
their country but not available under United States law. Following a
perception of such insufficient appreciation of foreign privileges, the en-
actment of a German blocking statute has been advocated so as obtain
"quasi-diplomatic" protection and therefore "better chances" in United
States discovery proceedings for the confidentiality concerns of German
defendants.255
In addition, it should not be overlooked that the taking into account
of foreign blocking statutes and government protests against United
States attempts to obtain evidence abroad as a source of inspiration for
See Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and
Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 894 (1981).
252 United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903-04 ("simply a privilege that can be
waived"). See also Note, Limitations, supra note 82, at 1458. See generally Wilkey, Transnational
Adjudication: A View from the Bench, 18 INT'L LAw. 541, 543 (1984); Ristau, Overview of Interna-
tional Judicial Assistance, 18 INT'L LAW. 525, 531 (1984).
253 Schlosser, supra note 68, at 398 (describing privileges under French, British and German law);
Gerber, supra note 22, at 764. See also Meessen, supra note 95, at 844-45 (privileges as part of
constitutional rights protecting privacy and property).
254 Sociftd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2556 n.29.
255 STUERNER, LANGE & TANIGUCH, DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN,
107 (1986)(comments of H. Golsong).
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resolving discovery conflicts25 6 is liable to invite even more public inter-
ventions of this kind and to encourage further confrontation. It would
thus punish those countries which so far have exercised restraint in inter-
national discovery conflicts and accord more favorable treatment to
countries with more hostile attitudes towards United States discovery
proceedings. Furthermore, the long-term discovery interests of United
States plaintiffs are hardly served by the balancing of interests because
this formula subjects international litigation to very uncertain criteria.
Considering the history of international discovery conflicts with respect
to privileges, it could be argued that it was also the inadequate examina-
tion of foreign legal protections concerning business secrets and other
confidential information which has provoked foreign protests257 and con-
tributed to the enactment of blocking statutes.258
The Supreme Court opinion in Sociitd Nationale Industrielle Adros-
patiale seems to recognize the equal value of foreign legal protections as
opposed to blocking statutes which "need not be given the same defer-
ence by courts of the United States as substantive rules of law at variance
with the law of the United States. ' 25 9 Without mentioning privileges, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "some discovery procedures are
much more 'intrusive' than others." The Court also commented that
"American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise
256 Paikin, supra note 27, at 326 (examples of cases where foreign government intervention was
given weight in the interest analysis). See also SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111,
118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)("Neither the United States nor the Swiss Government has suggested that dis-
covery be halted."); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d at 904 ("[I]t is noteworthy
that neither the Department of State nor the German Government has expressed any view on this
case.. ."); In re Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24, 28 (W.D. Mich. 1982)("Neither am I convinced
that the German Government has taken a position against disclosure of the records.")
257 These protests were especially pronounced in cartel cases. For a compilation of these inter-
ventions with texts of diplomatic notes, see Haight, Extracts From Some Published Material on Offi-
cial Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, Etc., in FiFTY-FiRsT CONFERENCE, supra note 25,
at 565-92.
258 Soci td Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1986
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1539, 1542; Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980-
Britain's Latest Weapon in the Fight Against United States Antitrust Law, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
341, 372 (1981); Note, Compelling Production, supra note 73, at 895-96 (blocking statutes enacted in
anticipation of future litigation); Rahl, supra note 1, at 373.
259 Socidti Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2556 n.29, citing RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 437, Reporter's Note 5. See also Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1986 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1504, 1516:
(F)oreign nations will often have more specific and concrete interests that merit accommodation
from United States courts. Foreign laws may provide particular protection to various liberty,
property and privacy interests, according business secrets or confidential communications (for
example) special immunity from disclosure. Foreign nations may also provide testimonial privi-
leges that are generally absent in this Nation's courts. In these instances, a foreign government
may have understandable concerns that unbridled United States discovery will infringe substan-
tive protections provided to its citizens.
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special vigilance to protect foreign litigants.
260
XII. PROPOSAL FOR THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN PRIVILEGES
It follows from these considerations that in United States discovery
proceedings, recognition of foreign privileges as an expression of impor-
tant values should be granted on the basis of judicial "self-restraint '261 as
regards the exercise of discovery powers against foreign parties or wit-
nesses. Judicial respect for substantive rights enjoyed under foreign law is
especially important in the stage of jurisdictional discovery. If in per-
sonam jurisdiction is challenged by a foreign party, principles of due pro-
cess require that foreign legal privileges are respected.262 Similar
considerations apply to foreign witnesses who are not party to the dis-
pute.263 The recognition of foreign privileges should not be limited to
privileges which are similar to those established under United States
law.264 A "shared values" test would limit privilege recognition to those
cases where the same type of privilege exists under both legal systems but
where the privilege in question differs in scope, for example as to the
conditions under which the privilege is waived. Such a comparative
analysis would finally lead to judicial determinations based upon United
States privilege values and might lead to new legal difficulties.
Recognition of foreign privileges should be accorded on the basis of
a certain number of easily identifiable criteria. These elements would
assure a high degree of predictability in the field of evidentiary conflicts
and thus enhance legal certainty.265 It should be noted that the Supreme
260 SocididNationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557. See also id. at 2563 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting ), discussing "protection of certain underlying substantive rights."
See also Maier, supra note 98, at 312-14; Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1971).
In this case where a forum selection clause was at issue, the Supreme Court rejected the "parochial
concept" that all disputes must be resolved under United States law as follows: "We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets ... exclusively on our terms governed by our laws and
resolved in our courts."
261 Sociftd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See also Gerber, supra note 22, at 764-67 ("privacy spheres"); Christoforou, supra note 231, at 40.
262 Note, The Use of Discovery to Obtain Jurisdictional Facts, 59 VA. L. Rv. 533, 546-47 (1973).
See also Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1981). It is
interesting to note that in this case the foreign defendant did not invoke a privilege to justify the
refusal to produce confidential insurance policies but objected to discovery on the grounds of bur-
densomeness and lack of control over the documents in question. Id. at 698.
263 Developments, supra note 44, at 1050; Gerber, supra note 22, at 786; Struve, supra note 97, at
1103; Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 334, 348-49; Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jen-
rette Securities Corp., [1986] 2 W.L.R. 453, 460, 462 (Ch. D.).
264 Grossfeld & Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts in International
Economic Law, 32 INT'' & CoMP. L.Q. 931, 941 (1983).
265 The Supreme Court has emphasized the principle of "predictability essential to any interna-
tional business transaction" with regard to the enforcement of international arbitration agreements,
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Court in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale expressly refrained
from establishing criteria regarding the application of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention. 66 Recognition of foreign privileges in international
discovery conflicts should be granted on the basis of criteria different
from those established by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
concerning United States interstate privilege conflicts which states that:
Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the communication but which is not priv-
ileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some
special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given
effect.
267
Foreign parties or witnesses invoking a privilege must raise this ob-
jection in time and substantiate their claim of protection. The person
opposing discovery on privilege grounds carries the burden of establish-
ing the existence of such a right both from a factual and legal point of
view.268 If necessary, expert testimony is to be called.2 69 In those cases
where expert opinion was contradictory or unclear United States courts
have determined foreign law in their own judgment.270 Any remaining
doubts as to the existence and the scope of a foreign privilege must go to
the disadvantage of the person invoking the privilege.
This Article suggests the following exclusionary criteria according
to which foreign privileges not available under United States federal law
invoked by foreign litigants or non-party witnesses should not be recog-
nized in United States discovery proceedings. Some of these criteria have
been inferred from the above reviewed case law.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974). The Supreme Court rejected the exclusive
application of "United States standards of fairness" holding that such notion "demeans the stan-
dards of justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalts the privacy of United States law
over the laws of other countries." Id. at 517, n. 11.
266 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
267 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(2)(1971); Grossfeld & Rogers, supra
note 264, at 940.
268 Miller, supra note 75, at 638; Graco v. Kremlin, 101 F.R.D. 503, 516-17 (N.D. Ill.
1984)(waiver of a privilege because of failure to assert it properly). See also Sass, Foreign Law in
Federal Courts, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 108-09 (1981).
269 Istituto per lo Sviluppo Economico v. Sperti Products, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Miller, supra note 75, at 658; Peritz, Determination of Foreign Law UnderRule 44.1, 10 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 67, 74-76 (1975); Note, Limitations, supra note 82, at 1442, 1464.
270 First National City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, S.A., 398 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1968);
Ramsay v. Boeing, 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970). In SEC v. Minas de Artemisa S.A., 150 F.2d 215
(9th Cir. 1945), the court modified a subpoena requiring the production in Arizona of corporate
books located in Mexico, since compliance would have required a violation of Mexican law. As
modified, the subpoena ordered the corporation to apply to Mexican fiscal authorities for permission
to remove the books, or, in the alternative, to require the corporation to allow the SEC to copy the
books in Mexico, thus avoiding a violation of Mexican law. See also In re Application of Chase
Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
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As outlined earlier, blocking statutes designed to obstruct foreign
discovery proceedings27 cannot be qualified as conferring privileges.
This applies not only to statutes which have been enacted recently as a
reaction to United States discovery orders, such as the British Protection
of Trading Interests Act,272 but also to long-standing foreign legislation
which distinguishes between disclosure requirements in a domestic con-
text and foreign discovery orders.
Swiss law provides an example of the latter type of law.27
Although Swiss banking secrecy was established before the first interna-
tional discovery disputes arose274 it should be noted that Article 273 of
the Swiss Criminal Code applies only to the disclosure of business infor-
mation to foreign persons or authorities.275 Article 47 of the Swiss Bank
Act prohibits secrecy violations concerning financial information gener-
ally, not especially with regard to foreign subjects. However it provides
also that federal and cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to
testify and to furnish information to a government authority "shall re-
main reserved." '276 A closer look at Swiss law relating to civil, criminal
and administrative proceedings reveals that in domestic proceedings in
Switzerland the bank secrecy privilege, i.e., the right of the bank to refuse
disclosure of financial information to judicial or administrative authori-
ties, is greatly restricted.277 While most cantonal codes of civil and crim-
inal procedure grant privileges to clergymen, physicians and lawyers,
bankers are excluded.278 Only a few cantons grant a bank secrecy privi-
lege in civil proceedings.2 79
271 Note, Shortening the Long Arm of United States Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and
the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 213 (1982). Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Stat-
utes and US. Discovery: A Conflict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 417, 420-21
(1977).
272 Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act,
1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
273 Meyer, Banking Secret and Economic Espionage, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 284 (1954); Muel-
ler, The Swiss Banking Secret From a Legal View, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 360 (1969); Kelly, United
States Foreign Policy: Efforts to Penetrate Bank Secrecy in Switzerland From 1940 to 1975, 6 CAL. W.
INT'L L. J. 211 (1976); Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and its Implications in the United States, 14
NEw ENG. L. REv. 18 (1978)[hereinafter Swiss Banking].
274 Meyer, Swiss Banking, supra note 273, at 24.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 27. See also Comment, Foreign Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of United States Securities
Laws, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1061, 1064-65 (1984)[hereinafter Foreign Bank Secrecy].
277 Meyer, Swiss Banking, supra note 273, at 30-31.
278 Id. at 31.
279 Id. at 32. See also Note, Compelling Production, supra note 73, at 901; Soctidt Nationale
Industrielle Airospatiale, Brief for Switzerland, 1986 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1549, 1554. The
limits to Swiss secrecy provisions and the disclosure requirements in banking matters have been
described by Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2
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This Article suggests that foreign privileges should be recognized in
United States discovery proceedings only to the extent they may be in-
voked in the same type of proceedings in the foreign country con-
cerned.28° If under foreign law a privilege is only available in civil
litigation but not in criminal cases, such a distinction should also apply
in United States discovery proceedings. As outlined above, a banker's
privilege is recognized under the German Code of Civil Procedure, but
not under the German Code of Criminal Procedure.28'
Second, as far as the nature of the discovery proceedings is con-
cerned, it should be noted that the courts have limited their willingness
to recognize foreign privileges to private litigation, while privilege claims
in administrative or grand jury investigations have been rejected. The
more accommodating position towards the nondisclosure of privileged
information in most of the above described civil cases represents a signifi-
cant choice in favor of certain private interests protected by foreign sub-
stantive laws over conflicting interests of United States litigants in the
full disclosure of confidential evidence.
In contrast, United States courts have refused to recognize foreign
privilege claims which had been advanced by United States citizens as
well as by foreign parties and witnesses against discovery orders by
United States law enforcement authorities in tax and securities investiga-
tions. As far as United States citizens were concerned, these privilege
claims were rejected on the ground that the subjection of United States
subjects to United States tax and securities laws could not suffer an ex-
ception simply because certain commercial or financial information was
located in a foreign jurisdictions where this evidence was privileged.
INT'L TAX & Bus. L., 273, 280-81 (1984). Olson, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 999, 1003, 1010 (1984)(citing examples of "inconsistent representation
and legal theories about foreign law").
280 In United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, the defendant sought to prevent a grand jury from
obtaining information in the Cayman Islands that would have been obtainable by officials there for
their own investigatory purposes. The Court in denying the defence held that "since the general rule
appears to be that for domestic investigations such information would be obtainable, we find it diffi-
cult to understand how the bank's customers' rights of privacy would be significantly infringed sim-
ply because the investigating body is a foreign tribunal." Id. at 408. For a similar position with
respect to the Bahamian bank secrecy law see United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
("It is incongruous to suggest that a United States court afford greater protection to the customer's
right of privacy than would a Bahamian court simply because this is a foreign tribunal." Id. at 1391
(citing United States v. Field, supra). See also Foreign Bank Secrecy, supra note 276, at 439.
281 United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d at 897. See S. SICHTERMANN, supra note
119, at 37-38 and 208-09. See also Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 727, 732 n.4 (1980)(citing the
Bahamian Banks Act and concluding, "The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its
application is limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no authority con-
struing its terms.").
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As to investigative subpoenas addressed to foreign nationals, United
States courts have affirmed the overriding importance of those fact-find-
ing processes designed to ascertain infringements of United States laws.
In SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, Judge Pollack ruled on the for-
eign defendant's claim of bank secrecy against a United States grand jury
investigation concerning securities laws violations as follows: "[i]t would
be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American
markets, violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw
profits and resist accountability for itself and its principals for the illegal-
ity by claiming their anonymity under foreign law." '282
As to the trial position of the person claiming a privilege, rights of
plaintiffs and defendants have to be distinguished. As to the former,
United States courts have opposed attempts by foreign plaintiffs to rely
upon privileges available under their domestic legal systems against dis-
covery requests by United States parties. The courts have rejected the
notion that foreign plaintiffs could avail themselves of privileges not rec-
ognized by the forum and have emphasized the principle that the plaintiff
by his action subjects himself to the lexfori.283 A foreign plaintiff should
therefore not be permitted to seek relief in another forum and rely upon a
different legal system to refuse disclosure of evidence.284
Another limitation to the recognition of foreign privileges in United
282 92 F.RD. 111, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also United States v. Bowe, 694 F.2d 1256 (11th
Cir. 1982)(attorney-client privilege under Bahamian law not applicable to grand jury discovery pro-
ceedings in another jurisdiction); Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16 N.Y.UJ.
INT'L L. & POL 999 (1984).
283 Dunham, supra note 76, at 50, 51, 53; Weinstein, supra note 76, at 535-44; Bishop, supra note
23, at 404; Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 332, 346; Gerber, supra note 22, at 786.
284 The International Law Association gave the following comment in its Report of the Fifty-
Second Conference (1966):
Where a non-resident alien chooses to appear as claimant he must submit to the procedure of
the court in which he applies, including its procedure of discovery; and again it is no answer
merely that the documents are abroad, or that discovery is illegal by the lex situs. Where a non-
resident alien fails to comply with a discovery order properly made, there is nothing in interna-
tional law that would preclude the court from making inferences against him in accordance
with its own law of evidence; or, from dismissing the claim or striking out the defense, as the
case may be.
Id. at 112. See also Soletanche & Rodio v. Brown & Lambrecht, 99 F.R.D. 269, 271 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
As regards foreign sovereigns suing in United States courts, this principle was established by the
Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1937)(citations omitted):
It is true that upon the principle of comity foreign sovereigns and their public property are not
to be amenable to suit in our courts without their consent.... But very different considerations
apply where the foreign sovereign avails itself of the privilege, likewise extended by comity, of
suing in our ourts.... By voluntarily appearing in the role of suitor it abandons its immunity
from suit and subjects itself to the procedure and rules of decision governing the forum which it
has sought. Even the domestic sovereign by joining in suit accepts whatever liabilities the court
may decide to be a reasonable incident of that.
The Supreme Court cited various cases where it was held that "a foreign sovereign as suitor is
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States discovery proceedings which can be derived from the cases dis-
cussed in this Article could be characterized as a bad faith exception.285
United States courts have emphasized their hostility to the recognition of
foreign privileges in those cases where the defendant opposing disclosure
of certain information transfers this evidence to another country with the
express purpose to obstruct United States discovery proceedings. Com-
mercial or financial documents can therefore not be protected from dis-
closure under a foreign privilege if the location of this evidence is not the
result of normal business transactions28 6 but rather an attempt to evade
United States law enforcement or to conceal information from the oppo-
nent.287 This bad faith exception has been summarized as follows:
Defendant cannot be allowed to shield crucial documents from discovery by
parties with whom it has dealt in the United States merely by storing them
with its affiliate abroad. Nor can it shield documents by destroying its own
copies and relying on customary access to copies maintained by its affiliate
abroad. If defendant could so easily evade discovery, every United States
company would have a foreign affiliate for storing sensitive documents.
288
Another U.S. District Court has described this exception as the "deliber-
ate courting of legal impediments to the production of documents."2 9
Under the principles of comity290 the mutual respect for other legal
systems in international relations implies that United States courts are
entitled to limit the recognition of privileges to persons of those countries
whose courts are equally prepared to recognize United States privileges
in a reverse situation. For example, the reciprocity principle is embodied
in the above mentioned exchange of notes between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany concerning diplomatic and consular
depositions by which both countries accord each other privileged status
as compared to the other signatories of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion.29' The necessity of reciprocal tolerance with a view to "a well func-
tioning international order" has also been emphasized by the dissenting
subject to the local rules of the domestic forum as to costs" and that "the foreign sovereign suing as a
plaintiff must give discovery." Id. at 134 n.2.
285 Dunham, supra note 76, at 53 (privileges used to "perpetrate harm"); Grossfeld & Rogers,
supra note 264, at 943.
286 In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)("legitimate use").
287 United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Thier, 767 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1985).
288 Cooper Industries Inc. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
289 General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 307 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
290 Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17.222, 17.223 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Maier, supra note 98, at 303-04 (comity implies the reciprocal tolerance of foreign legal val-
ues); Note, Limitations, supra note 82, at 1485.
291 Shemanski, supra note 6, at 478; Maier, supra note 98, at 281-85; Christoforou, supra note
231, at 42; Smit, supra note 19, at 147.
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opinion in Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale.292 Since United
States discovery rules are generally much broader and provide for fewer
privileges than those of most other Western nations, questions of reci-
procity have not yet arisen, and are unlikely to arise very often.29 3
Recognition of foreign privileges should not be granted if there is
lack of a genuine connection between the foreign statute invoked and the
facts upon which the privilege claim is raised.294 Such a link is not pres-
ent if the communication or relationship are not situated in the foreign
legal system whose protection is sought or if the number and the nature
of the contacts with that system is insignificant or fortuitous. Nationality
alone would therefore not suffice to establish the requisite connection
with foreign law. In the area of United States interstate privilege conflicts
this requirement has been described as the most significant relationship
test. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws enumerates four fac-
tors to be considered, among them (1) the number and nature of the
contacts that the state of the forum maintains with the parties and the
transaction involved:
The forum will be more inclined to give effect to a privilege if it was proba-
bly relied upon by the parties. Such reliance may be found if at the time of
the communication the parties were aware of the existence of the privilege
in the local law of the state of most significant relationship. Such reliance
may also be found if the parties, although unaware of the existence of the
privilege, made the communication in reliance on the fact that communica-
tions of the sort involved are treated in strict confidence in the state of most
significant relationship. In this latter situation, the fact that the communi-
cation was of a sort treated in strict confidence in the state of most signifi-
cant relationship was presumably a result of the existence of the privilege.
Hence, in a real sense the parties could be said to have relied upon the
292 Sociitd Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559, 2562 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
See also id. at 2560 n.3 regarding reciprocal protection of confidential information. "The United
States is increasingly concerned, for example, with protecting sensitive technology for both economic
and military reasons. It may not serve the country's long-term interest to establish precedents that
could allow foreign courts to compel production of the records of United States corporations."
293 Smit, supra note 66, at 1033. For a similar doctrine in the area of recognition of foreign
judgments, see Comment, The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 16 COLUM.
T.TRANSNAT'L L. 327 (1977); von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister State Judgments,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1044 (1981).
294 Grossfeld & Rogers, supra note 264, at 944-45. Friedman & Wilson, supra note 21, at 357-58.
See also Smit, supra note 66, at 1032. This principle has been emphasized in United States interstate
conflict situations. In Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, 79 F.R.D. 72, 79,
110 (D.P.R. 1978), the District Court held that an extrastate witness could rely upon a New York
accountant-client privilege not available under the law of the forum because of the more significant
relationship of the confidential communication with New York. See also Hill v. Huddleston, 263 F.
Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1967); Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.
1972)("center of gravity" test).
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privilege although ignorant of it.2 95
For example, if a witness claims the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, there must be a serious risk for criminal prosecution in the foreign
country to which the witness stands in a close relationship. As regards
communicative privileges, the person invoking a right to refuse disclo-
sure of evidence must be able to show reliance on this particular legal
protection. Such legitimate expectations are not present if the communi-
cation took place in a jurisdiction where the advisory relationship in
question is not privileged.
XIII. CONCLUSION
If none of the above enumerated exclusionary elements are present,
there should be a presumption favoring recognition of foreign privileges
against United States discovery orders. A similar approach has been ad-
vocated with respect to international tribunals in cases where defendants
allege that judicial inquiry infringes protected private spheres.29 6 Both
international and national courts must be sensitive to the danger that
because of evidentiary incursions into protected areas the adjudication of
transnational litigation is seriously disrupted. If judicial restraint in or-
der to avoid the violation of foreign substantive rights implies procedural
disadvantages to the plaintiff, the protection of confidentiality should
prevail.2 97 Such a result would be justified because privileges are gener-
ated by a certain number of individual circumstances in connection with
a general rule of law unrelated to the particular litigation.
On the basis of these eliminating criteria, a high degree of predict-
ability and legal certainty as to the resolution of international discovery
conflicts in the area of privileges should be guaranteed. The willingness
of United States courts to examine privilege claims based upon foreign
law and to recognize them on the basis of well-defined criteria would
contribute to a reduction of international discovery disputes and avoid
further "accumulation of resentment.' ' 298  United States courts would
thus obtain increasing acceptance of their discovery orders relating to
foreign parties or witnesses and diminish perceptions of United States
"insensitivity to the interests safeguarded by foreign legal regimes."2 99
Since discovery proceedings remain subject to the provisions of the Fed-
295 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 139(2) comment d (1971).
296 Reisman & Friedman, The Plaintiff's Dilemma: Illegally Obtained Evidence and Admissibility
in International Adjudication, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 738 (1982).
297 Id. at 753 ("The plaintiff's dilemma should be resolved against the plaintiff.").
298 SocidtdNationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2568 (Blackmun, ., dissenting); see also
Maier, supra note 98, at 318-20.
299 Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2568.
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure, the recognition of foreign privileges im-
plies only a minor deviation from the legal principles established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and much less restrictions of the dis-
covery process than resort to the Hague Evidence Convention. The rec-
ognition of foreign privileges should not be regarded as a threat to United
Siates discovery proceedings but rather as being in the long-term interest
of United States litigants and the United States judicial system."°
300 Id. emphasizing the "larger context" of international discovery conflicts which goes beyond
the immediate and narrow interests of the litigants and the necessity to satisfy "mutual expectations"
in international legal relations.
